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Canada's official development assistance for news media and journalism promotion in the developing world: Uncertain objectives and inconsistent outcomes.

Blake Cameron Roberts
University of Windsor

CANADA'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR NEWS MEDIA AND JOURNALISM PROMOTION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD:

UNCERTAIN OBJECTIVES AND INCONSISTENT OUTCOMES

by

Blake Cameron Roberts

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Abstract

The prevailing assumption among Western governments is that a free and independent news media is a key to political transition in the developing world. Consequently, media assistance interventions are components of all Western states' democratization, good governance and civil society promotion strategies. It is not clear, however, that Western support for the news media has a lasting effect on the political transition of the developing world. There are strong militating factors that hinder the establishment of a free and independent media sector in most developing states. This study examines specific aspects of Canada's media assistance strategy and engages in a comparative analysis of developing world states receiving Canadian media aid. Findings yield recommendations for improved effectiveness of interventions.

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Introduction

Canada and other Western governments have long advocated media assistance interventions as a key component of democratization, good governance and civil society promotion strategies. The end of the Cold War presented a renewed opportunity to re-structure the news media in states that had been denied the rights of free expression and access to information previously.[1] Western governments consequently re-emphasized media assistance strategies as a component of political development after 1989. There are two overarching justifications for this strategy. First, Western governments contend that free, plural, independent media are a cornerstone of political development. Second, access to independent news media is a human right. More specifically, in states undergoing political transition from an authoritarian or totalitarian regime, the rationale for promoting free and independent media is practical: free expression allows individuals to develop their intellectual and spiritual capacities, and free expression can promote the search for civic truths which, in theory, may lead to reconciliation and peaceful cooperation among citizens of a state and consequently to economic development.[2] But despite the apparent universality of these justifications, the progress of media rights has been erratic as new democratic states emerged after the Cold War. Large sums have been spent on media development without much thought as to what form either journalism or democracy

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[1] Aspen Institute, Journalism and Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Societies in Transition (Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute, 2001), 1.

[2] Aspen, 5

should take.[3] Nonetheless, Western governments continue to promote media assistance as a component of Official Development Assistance (ODA)[4].

Recently, however, the media, as an aspect of promotion strategies, have begun to face renewed scrutiny because it is apparent that a mechanical view of the role and function of the news media is challenged by the unique characteristics of developing world states. In the specific case of Canada's media assistance interventions, this paper argues that Canada's ODA for the media is poorly-focused, the rationale is general, expectations are uncertain and outcomes are inconsistent. In this way, media assistance interventions may reflect in microcosm one of the underlying criticisms of Canada's overall ODA strategy: Canada's ODA budget is too small and too widely scattered to effect change and positive, enduring outcomes. More than that, the theory behind all Western media assistance interventions may be inherently flawed. *Free* media may be attainable but unsustainable. *Independent* media may be both difficult to attain and even harder to sustain given particular political and economic conditions in many developing world states. And developing *plural* media may simply be impossible in states riven by sectarian and ethic divides. In the worst case, unrestrained free expression may even lead to the failure of a state or in the worse case incite genocide. The example of the media in Western political development, although an attractive and understandable model, may be too simple a paradigm for the complexities of the developing world.

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[3] Aspen, 13

[4] ODA is defined by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as funding flowing from official agencies that have as their main objective the promotion of economic development and welfare and are concessional -- they are loaned on soft terms and have a grant component of at least 25 percent. Source: The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; available from www.oecd.org/dac.

This study has two purposes. The primary purpose is to examine Canadian media ODA. Secondarily, this paper is an investigation of the extent to which Western media principles, techniques, standards and ethics are applicable in the developing world. This study examines these issues as follows: first, the problem and the purpose of the study are established. Then, the history of the theory behind both political development and media assistance is reviewed. Next, Canada's news media assistance strategies, past and present, are examined in light of Canadian foreign aid objectives. This includes analysis of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that receive Canadian media assistance. Examples of Canada's media assistance interventions, economic, political and social conditions of these recipient states, NGOs involved in the intervention, and outcomes of select media assistance interventions provide the data from which findings and discussion are generated. Specialists and experts in the area of media assistance are used to verify findings. Lastly, and in summation, recommendations for future Canadian media assistance interventions are proposed.

This research is timely since the Canadian government is currently engaged in a review of its foreign aid objectives. Additionally, since research into Western governments' media assistance in the developing world is still in its infancy[5] and the body of literature on the intent, application and effectiveness of media assistance interventions, while growing, remains small, this paper will also add to the literature on promotion strategies by examining a single facet of ODA, but a facet upon which great expectations of political development are founded.

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[5] Ross Howard, Working Paper 19: International Media Assistance: A Review of Donor Activities and Lessons Learned, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2003), 7.

1.1 The Problem/Purpose of Study

The problem researched in this study is best framed as a question: Is media assistance an effective way to spend Canada's ODA? In order to know this we must determine if media assistance interventions work. In seeking an answer to this question we must ask supplementary questions: What is media assistance? What does the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) expect media assistance to accomplish? Is the relationship between the media and political development normative, or is a political transition far too complex a process for a cause-and-effect relationship between a media assistance intervention and an outcome to be clearly seen? Is it even worthwhile to look for a normative relationship such as this?

Assuming at the outset that the process of political development is rarely linear, a simplistic normative relationship between media assistance and political development is unlikely to exist. However, this does not infer that a relationship of some form does *not* exist. There are, this paper suggests, key mitigating factors affecting both the success and the failure of a media assistance intervention. Also, larger political events may overwhelm others factors and players in a political transition. Indeed, in the fluidity of political transition the media's role may be over estimated. On the contrary, we may not even be aware of the extent of the media's participation in a successful transition or, for that matter, the media's failure to perform its function in a transition.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 Media Assistance: The transfer of a Western political development

The modern term "media assistance" applies to the subset of democratization, good governance, civil society and related promotion strategies that have a media component. It is a broad subset containing several variations. In its most identifiable form media assistance is the promotion of *news* media and the profession of journalism in a developing state. Donor states transfer technology such as printing presses, radio and television transmitters, and provide funding for direct training of and support for developing world journalists.[6] Canadian NGOs such as Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE) and the Institute for Media, Politics and Civil Society (IMPACS), as well as universities and other organizations, perform such functions. From there, media assistance spreads into a wider web of interventions. One also finds media assistance interventions that are designed to support the work of journalists, including the training of management personnel, market analysts and advertising staff so that a media outlet can eventually be self-sustaining. On-going financial support for operations is sometimes provided. As well, Canada and other Western governments fund organizations that supply media content, such as those that write scripts for broadcast in the developing world,[7] and religious organizations that broadcast content.[8] While these groups are not journalistic *per* se, they engage

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[6] Many training interventions are short-term initiatives in which a Canadian trainer is flown to a country to present seminars and workshops. Training initiatives are also situational in that a Western donor state supplies trainers for, say, TV coverage of an election. Canada has funded trainers for election broadcasts in various states including South Africa.

[7] http://www.farmradio.org/eng/scripts.php#subject13

[8] As examples, some of the Canadian religious organizations that receive media assistance from CIDA include the Oblats, The Jesuits, The United Church of Canada. Source: Government of Canada, Parliamentary Library.

in a kind of current affairs journalism that penetrates civil society. Media assistance can also be defined as the support and development of the social and political environment in which a plural independent media can be developed. This level is itself very broad with merging and overlapping interests and promotion strategies. Examples of this level of media assistance are interventions that promote the rule of law and media rights within the legal system, and the development of civil society and an awareness of the media's role within it. In the main, this study examines media assistance interventions having a clear journalistic focus.

Today's web of media assistance interventions has two clear antecedents. The first antecedent is the history of the development of the Western concept of journalism itself. In the political culture of the West the media has acquired nearly unassailable status. Independent media are held to be fundamental to democracy, civil society and good governance. The prevailing assumption in the West is that the media are liberal pluralist; journalists are generally expected to be autonomous of the state, from business, and from interest groups with a legitimate function in a "multipart conversation among citizens and political institutions".[9] Furthermore, in the West the news media are also held to be a guarantor of citizens' rights – the celebrated watchdog function of the media. The rights of Western media are firmly established in jurisprudence through case law on libel, slander and fair comment, and courts continue to clash with the media in the West over the protection of journalistic sources to the point where reporters are jailed for not revealing information in the course of an investigation. As well, an organic set of media principals and ethics

[9] Lydia Miljan, Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 12

have emerged in the Western states to regulate and guide media practitioners in their work. Western governments have also formally retained regulatory authority over the content and actions of radio and television media through licensing conditions, which legitimize the role and function of the electronic media. All of these factors combine to make the media a mature, important and powerful component of the political system of the West. How the media attained this status is well-known. The principles of free speech date back centuries. With advances in printing, pamphleteers and journalists such as Paine and Brissot emerged to influence events during the American and French Revolutions respectively. Tocqueville wrote of newspapers as a civil bond that linked 19th century Americans to a distant government while also providing a forum in which political news was disseminated. The press, Tocqueville said, "makes political life circulate... forces men to come in turn to appear before the court of opinion. It rallies interests around certain doctrines and formulates the creeds of the parties. Through it they speak to each other without being put in contact."[10] Successive Western journalists, scholars, jurists and leaders have cemented this bond between free speech, the media and the citizenry. Today's Western journalist consequently owes her privileges to a lengthy historical process – sometimes a struggle – over the rights of free speech.[11] The process establishing the rights and functions of the modern media has therefore been symbiotic with the process of democratization, the construction of civil society and the development of good governance in Western political culture.

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[10] Alexis de Tocqueville, , Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000)

[11] For an examination of how Canada's modern broadcast system emerged, see David Ellis, Evolution of the Canadian Broadcasting System: Objectives and Realities, 1928-1968 (Hull: Government of Canada, 1979)

Yet, the function of the media continues to be the subject of much academic debate in the West. Scholars debate the influence the media have in our lives, whether the media's influence is positive, neutral, or negative; how the personal points-of-view of owners, managers and journalists infuse their reporting; which issues they select to make prominent; what agendas, if any, they set, how they frame stories,[12] how the media affect our perceptions and the way they alter our interaction with fellow citizens and the world.[13] That Western media are truly liberal-pluralist, is debatable. Nonetheless, even while this debate on the influence of the news media rages unresolved in the West, media modeled along Western lines have been and continue to be actively promoted in the developing world through Western governments' ODA strategies. Canada, the United States and European governments do so through their ODA delivery agencies and subsequently through NGOs.[14] To put it simply, the strategy of media assistance assumes that if it worked in the West, it should work in the developing world.

The second antecedent of modern media assistance is found in the history of media assistance itself. The concept of media assistance evolved partially from technology transfer: with the transfer of developed world technologies – first the printing press, then radio, TV and now new media – to the developing world, Western journalistic principles and Western journalism's role in political development have natu-

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[12] See Chomsky, Cooper, Miljan, Nesbitt-Larking, Putnam, Soroka, Winter, et al.

[13] Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (New York: Penguin, 1985) and Putnam, Robert, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

[14] Canada (CIDA), United States (USAID); Others: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA), Stiftungen (Germany); From 1992-1997 the EU=PHARE (Poland Hungary Association for the Reconstruction of the Economy) and TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth on Independent States) Democracy Programmes (Known together as PTDP);

rally accompanied the technology.[15] The colonizing state transferred communications technology (first print, then electronic) and programming for the benefit of its colonists. Although the content and style were targeted at colonists there was a spill over effect on the indigenous population. Developing world journalists learned a specific skill-set – an operator's manual for the technology transferred by mimicking the practices of Western journalism. But media assistance took on a more coherent strategic identity during the rapid de-colonization of the 1950s and 1960s. Recipient states called on Western trainers to teach journalism skills because of the "urgency with which ex-colonial nations wished to indigenize and expand broadcasting".[16] The developing nations requested help and they got it. Also, students from the developing world studied in the West and returned home, supposedly imbued with Western journalistic principles through cultural adaptation and professional education.[17] The process of "Westernizing" developing world media had begun because there are "contextual values and assumptions built into the very ethos of media professionalism as it is transferred to developing countries."[18] Due to this, it was inevitable that mass communication and journalism in much of the developing world should have a Western structure.[19] However, the great hope of a nationalist news media in Africa structured along Western lines, once allied with and celebrated by the leaders of independence movements during the struggle for liberation and imme-

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[15] Peter Golding, "Media Professionalism in the Third World: The Transfer of an Ideology," in Mass Communication and Society, ed. James Curran, Gurevtich, M and Woolacott, J. (New York: Arnold, 1977), 292

[16] Golding, 296

[17] Usman Jimada, "Eurocentric Media Training in Nigeria: What Alternative? Journal of Black Studies 22, no. 3 (Mar. 1992) : 370

[18] Golding 298

[19] Jimada, 367

diately after, became viewed as "treacherous" by the same leaders until today media freedom is widely restricted – even more so than it was under colonization.[20] Indeed, many of the great post-colonial African leaders, such as Nyerere, Kenyatta and Azikiwe were themselves either journalists or publishers before leading Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria respectively. Unfortunately, media rights and the progress of democratization, civil society and good governance have declined in these three countries and others in Africa since independence despite early optimism, a media infrastructure bequeathed by the colonizer and assistance interventions post-independence.[21]

Thus, these two antecedents – promotion of "Western style" media based on the assumption that media principles are universal, and the developing world's willingness to copy Western political development, dovetailed into the modern media assistance strategy that can be traced back half a century. Its strategic origins were clearly a component of Western governments' developmental models - the "antiseptic"[22], linear, universal, orthodox theory that was postulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s in response to what Huntington calls the "second short wave" of democratization,[23] intentionally following the Western path to political development.

~~Media assistance in the deve~~lopment theory of the time was to be used to "alter

[20] Kingsley O. Harbor, "The Mass Media and Stability in Africa," in Contending Issues in African Development: Advances, Challenges and the Future, ed. Obioma M. Ihedru (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 2001), 53.

[21] The result? Tanzanian media were limited and tightly controlled into the mid-1990s and are today emerging, but with restrictions still in place in many parts of the country. Kenya has a tenuous grasp on democracy now but a media community that deferred to the state under Moi has faced government sanctions as recently as 2003 and continues to be closely monitored. Nigeria has a vibrant media community but it is a state that has been wracked by internal conflict and human rights abuses. As in Kenya, restrictive regulations have recently been selectively imposed on the Nigerian media. Nigeria is one of the most dangerous places on earth for journalists to work. All three countries are deemed today to be only partly free.

[22] Howard Wiarda, Non-Western Theories of Development: Regional Norms versus Global Trends, (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 3.

[23] Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late 20th Century, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 16.

dia assistance in the development theory of the time was to be used to "alter attitudes and values" and, consistent with the spirit of the time, indicators of success would lie in cold, hard facts, such as the number of televisions and radios per capita necessary for development.[24] The appointment of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1961 illustrates how foreign policy, foreign aid, propaganda and the media merged into the developmental theory that defined the times.[25] Murrow's USIA was in the business of promoting the United States' political agenda. In doing so it also promoted Western media principles through funding of journalism schools[26], the training of journalists and the distribution of content. In this way the media "were agents of both nation-building and of enlarging that nation into a union of nations – politically, culturally or economically conceived."[27] Media assistance had become an intrinsic part of the larger objectives of the development model. The former colonial masters were as active as USAID was. For example, the United Kingdom and France continued to export Western technology and journalistic practices and principles through the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Societe de Radiodiffussion de la France d'Outre-Mer (SORAFAM) and later l'Office de Cooperation Radiophonique (OCORA) respectively.[28] The BBC sent a small army of trainers abroad to the United Kingdom's former colonies in the 1950s.[29] Yet

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[24] Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle, in Mass Media and Society, 2nd edition., ed. James Curran and Michael Gurevitch. (London: Arnold 1996), 178-179

[25] Joseph E. Persico, Edward R. Murrow: An American Original, (New York: Dell, 1988), 471.

[26] Nigeria's first journalism training institution, the Jackson College of Journalism in the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, was established in this way; source: Jimada, 370

[27] Michael Gurevitch, "The Globalization of Electronic Journalism" in Mass Media and Society, 2nd edition, ed. James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (London: Arnold 1996), 207

[28] For a list of some projects and participation in 1960s and 70s see Golding 296-297

[29] Jimada, 370

as the overall normative process of orthodox development became widely rejected, criticisms "largely passed by mass communications."[30] The promotion of the media in the developing world, seen to be fundamental to political development as it is in the West, was apparently immune from widespread criticism, even as other associated strategies appeared to fail. Consistently, media assistance strategies have faced limited critical review, even as Western governments, in particular the United States, have been maligned for exporting variations of media "style".[31]

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[30] Golding, 12

[31] Golding, 294

2.2 Media assistance in political development today

As noted, a justification for media assistance interventions is that the development of a Western-style news media can aid in political transition. More specifically, the media have a role to play in the promotion of democratization, of good governance and of civil society, the development of which also aids in the advancement of human rights, and, in certain cases contributes to peace building. Each of these aspects of media assistance theory are addressed in turn, below.

2.2.1 The media in the promotion of democratization, good governance and civil society

Democratization

In the early 1990s, as newly freed nations embraced political liberation following the end of the Cold War, scholars took a renewed look at why and how promotion strategies should be employed. In 1992 Diamond offered the following justifications for the United States to actively promote democratization in its national interest: democratization can reduce armed threats, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; democratization can lead to the peaceful resolution of conflict; democratization can open economies, thereby leading to wider prosperity, access to resources and freer trade; democratization can advance cooperation in dealing with unconventional challenges such as the illegal trade in drugs and environmental degradation; foreigners studying, working and traveling abroad are safer in democracies; democratic countries rarely go to war with each other or sponsor terrorism against other democracies.[32] In sum, the presumption is that democracies are far more reliable, stable partners than nations governed under other systems. But the distance between theory and reality is often vast. Attempting to define the process of democratiza-

[32]Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy 87 (1992): 28-30.

tion in a concise, brief summary is a nearly impossible task.[33] Many typologies, definitions, spectra, groups, classifications and indices have been assembled in the search for the formula of democratic development. States differ and democratic transitions are irregular. Whitehead reminds us to consider both democracy and democratization in the "light of their 'really existing' manifestations"[34] because the process of democratization is a complex, lengthy and non-linear process; there is no one-size fits-all process, no template of forms and institutions required to achieve it.[35] In fact, seeking linear schemes of causal connection may be "unhelpful".[36] The process of democratization must be viewed from a long historical perspective: it is complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended.[37]

Nonetheless, even though the process of democratization is "floating", it can be "anchored".[38] That one or more of the minimum conditions in transition models such as Dahl's, Karl's and Schmitter's[39] are often violated in today's emerging democracies challenges, however, conventional models. A new theory may be needed if these states are to make the transition to, and consolidate democracy.[40] Thus, free and independent media

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[33] In the The Third Wave, Huntington consumes eight pages discussing just the *meaning* of democracy. Huntington, 5-13

[34] Lawrence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 7.

[35] Kevin Quigley, "Democracy Assistance in South-East Asia: Long History/Unfinished Business" in Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization, ed. Peter Burnell (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 279

[36] Whitehead, 3

[37] Whitehead, 27

[38] Whitehead, 6

[39] Minimum conditions: 1. Control of government is constitutionally vested in public officials, 2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fair elections, 3. Universal adult suffrage, 4. Practically anyone is entitled to run for office, 5. Freedom of expression, 6. Citizens have a right to seek alternative information and alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law, 7. Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutionally vested authority without resistance from the bureaucracy, and 8. The polity must be self-governing; it must be sovereign in the international order.[39] Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven Conn: Yale University, 1971;* Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lyn Karl, *What Democracy Is and Isn't* in *the Global Resurgence of Democracy,* Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993)

[40] Whitehead, 28

may indeed be one of the theoretical anchors that attaches the many floating states[41] each with their own distinct characteristics, to the development of democracy.

What might the role of the media be then in a new theory of democratization? If a community of reflexive and cognitive citizens need exist - they must have the potential to participate "with some minimum degree of cognitive competence" that is, and the pool must not be too exclusive, then the media has a role in this: Individuals must first have cognition that they are citizens of a plural state; further, they must form shared understanding "about the nature of politics and the procedures of political dialogue".[42] Here again is the media's space in the non-linear, open-ended theory of democratization. The consensus is that at the very least the right - protected by law -- to seek alternative information and alternative sources of information is a skeletal underpinning of democratic development.

Also, because of questions surrounding fairness and equity of participation, emphasis in the promotion of democratization has moved away from "dramatic innovations" like elections to the political environment in which democracy develops.[43] Here is found justification for media assistance interventions in today's democratization promotion literature. For example, democratization according to CIDA's definition "involves building democratic institutions and practices and deepening democratic values in societies". The media are an intrinsic part of this for CIDA: "[A] free media can simultaneously challenge public action while serving as both an alternate information source and an educational tool."[44] One of CIDA's twenty "Types of interventions" is to "build the role of an independent, responsible

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41 Freedom of expression being one of Schmitter and Karl's minimum conditions.

42 Whitehead, 17

43 Peter Burnell, "Democracy Assistance: The State of the Art" in Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization , ed. Peter Burnell (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 349

44 Government of Canada. CIDA. Policy For CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance – Democratization. Ottawa: 1996. Available from http://www.acdi-ida.gc.ca/cida_ind.

media through training, technical assistance and linkages between journalists."[45] However, we must be cognizant that the role of the media in transition should undergo scrutiny as the transition paradigm shifts.[46] In other words, a one-size-fits-all media strategy may not be universally applicable. Modern media technology can, it seems, play an important role in the democratization process. A charismatic leader can use the modern tools of communication, replete with sound-bites, in the 'theatre' of transition to advance comprehension and aid in persuasion.[47] But technology can also be misused, including by disreputable journalists.

Good Governance

CIDA defines good governance as "the exercise of power by various levels of government that is effective, honest, equitable, transparent and accountable".[48] More specifically, CIDA includes sound economic policies, professional and effective public services, an independent judiciary, low levels of corruption, fiscal probity and accountability, and appropriate levels of military spending and military participation in civilian life, as components of good governance. Corruption can hinder both economic and political development, of course, but more importantly in terms of this analysis, the less corrupt a country, the more likely it is that ODA will be effective, according to the World Bank.[49] But promoting good governance is, like democracy promotion, a complex task. Governments are not monolithic. Depending on the structure of polity, governments have many different vertical and horizontal levels

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[45] Government of Canada., 7.

[46] Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy 13.1 (2002): 5-21.

[47] Whitehead, 50.

[48] Government of Canada. , 14

[49] World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why, (New York: World Bank, 1998), n. pag.

and connections, checks and balances. There is the constitutional level, the executive level, the electoral system level the legislative level, the bureaucratic level and the judicial level. Today's good governance promotion theory embraces a multi-sector strategy targeting institution building, civil service reform, accountability and transparency, with donor states selectively concentrating aid across these areas per their individual ODA strategies.[50] The result is a patchwork of emphases. Where the news media intersects with good governance in promotion literature is mainly in the function of monitor. Monitoring politicians is one of Whitehead's three defences against the abuse of money power in democratic politics, the other two being the rule of law and the "competition" in free elections perceived as "clean" by voters. Whitehead observes, "The citizenry or the electorate in a democratic society should be able to monitor the behavior of the politicians through a free and competitive press."[51] The news media thus have the capacity to alter public perception of corruption. For the transition to succeed, the public must gain "confidence that, despite individual scandals, an underlying 'ethic of responsibility' can be discerned".[52] On the other hand, the media can also reinforce the public's perception that government is corrupt. As the transition proceeds, citizens are therefore able to make decisions based on whether they perceive their government to be honest or corrupt. However, establishing free, independent and plural media to check government integrity is not easily accomplished. Transparency International, an NGO working in the area of good governance, reminds us that the independence of media owners ought to be a matter of concern in countries where corruption is high.

[50] Gordon Crawford, "Promoting democracy from without – learning from within (Part I)," Democratization, 10, 1 (Spring), 36.

[51] Whitehead, 118.

[52] Whitehead, 134.

of concern in countries where corruption is high. In developing world states, independent media can be brought to heel by government. Permits and licenses may be withdrawn or withheld. Censorship may be invoked. On the other hand, media independence is influenced by ownership. In many countries the media owners have diverse business interests that frequently bring them close to civil servants and leading politicians.[53] Private ownership can clearly distort the monitoring function of the media in the developing world as it does in the West. Likewise, one should not assume either that publicly-funded news media in the developing world are less biased than the privately controlled media. This causes concern for Transparency International as well: "A free press must be utterly free of government control. This demands ending the "phony excuses for supporting state-owned media, as if they alone can best serve the public interest".[54] The recent history of media development in transitional states shows this "uneasy partnership" between journalism and the state. Poland is one example where state-owned media have used justification of protecting 'national culture' to become the central players in the electronic medium, yet it is the government that makes political appointments to state radio and television.[55] Can the state broadcaster be trusted then to act independently of government and perform its function as monitor? Transparency International is blunt: "Wherever the state owns the media the temptation arises for politicians to abuse their power – and the dangers

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[53] Frank Vogl, Curbing Corruption: The Media's Work, Recommendations for Action, Section 5 - Media Ownership, (Berlin: Transparency International, 1999).

[54] Vogl, n pag.

[55] Wierzynski, Maciej, Aspen, 18 The same criticism is leveled at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Board of Directors which has been stacked with political appointees over the years. Even the Presidency of the CBC has become politicized. Current President Robert Rabinovitch and former President Perrin Beatty were both closely tied to the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party respectively, which were in office when each was appointed.

are especially great in the countries where the private media is (sic) far weaker than the state's media organs".[56]

Civil Society

Like democracy and good governance, civil society and its components are varied and complex. Civil society is a fluctuating concept that reflects the distinct characteristics of the political community in which it functions. At its simplest level civil society is the "sphere between the state and its citizens, in which a variety of voluntary and autonomous organizations exist and seek to protect the interests of their members".[57] Continuing to gather more components over time, modern civil society includes a plethora of media organizations, organized labour affiliates, professional associations, voluntary groups, religious societies and literally thousands of NGOs. Furthermore, the sphere of relationships between the state and its citizens continues to be altered by the pursuit and attainment of rights. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights is a seminal document that gave momentum to a global rights agenda which has been building since then, with only isolated state specific and regional setbacks. Rights have certainly become intrinsic to the Canadian political identity. According to Michael Ignatieff, Canada has one of the most distinct rights cultures in the world: "Canada has moved away from constitutional debates dominated by government and first ministers to a system of constitutional renewal

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[56] Frank Vogl, Strengthening the Global Media to Build Democracy: A Proposal, (Berlin: Transparency International, 2002), 10

[57] Quigley, 265

driven essentially by citizens, interest groups and nations".[58] This national experience is perhaps reflected in Canadian aid policy.

Traditionally, literature has overwhelmingly asserted a normative relationship between civil society and political development. Where a strong civil society is present, democracy should be easier and more durable, "where it is absent or weak, democratization would be precarious".[59] The free choice of individuals to interact with others in society and influence politics is an established liberal tradition. But civil society lacks clarity and consistency. Therefore it is difficult to discern power relations within it. Carothers cautions against assuming that there are only positive benefits accruing from the development and expansion of civil society.[60]

The predominant roles of the media in civil society theory are in maintaining its two traditional functions of watchdog (or guarantor) and conduit of information. As watchdog of government, they are a guarantor of liberal rights, of which the free association of individuals and their right to participate in the political system underscore the principles of civil society. Diamond is unequivocal: "Wider, freer, more open and independent flows of information are the indispensable foundation for civil society checks against the abuse of state power."[61] Whitehead reinforces this: the independent sphere of voluntary associations must guarantee each other's independ-

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[58] Michael Igantieff, The Rights Revolution, (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2000), 7.

[59] Whitehead, 69

[60] Thomas Carothers, "Civil Society;" Foreign Policy 117 (1999): 18-24+26-29. At the present time this criticism seems lost on CIDA which continues to extol the virtues of promoting civil society in the developing world – again a reflection, perhaps, of national experience.

[61] Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1999), 240.

ence through "principles of autonomy and mutual respect."[62] The news media can thus guarantee civil society two ways. For Diamond they act as the guarantor of civil society rights against the state, and for Whitehead the media guarantee the rights of the members of civil society to remain autonomous *within* civil society.

As a conduit of information the news media have two important functions in the advancement of civil society: the news media's actions keep the information flowing between the distinct parts of civil society itself and, the news media channels information from the civil society up the line to government in undertaking "both 'advocacy' and 'watchdog' roles, i.e. to channel public opinion to government and advocate for policy change as well as to scrutinize its activities".[63]

But the Western concept of journalism often fits "awkwardly" in civil society.[64] Is social responsibility the role of the journalist? That is, should journalism serve to build civic consciousness and social solidarity, or even economic development, all of which may contribute to the development of civil society? Or is the role of journalist strictly independent – a more libertarian model that emphasizes the independence of journalists and asserts the primacy of free speech and free expression while acting as watchdog? While other member groups of civil society may have clear and simple roles and responsibilities within civil society, journalism is a more complex component of it, reflecting often the individual attitudes and opinions of the journalists themselves, or the organization that employs them. In the developing world the clash between social responsibility and libertarian schools of journalism is even more

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[62] Whitehead, 68.

[63] Crawford, 34.

[64] Aspen, 10.

vivid. Given that even Western conventions acknowledge restrictions on journalistic independence may be imposed occasionally so as to maintain national security, public security, rights, the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and the like,[65] can journalists in the developing world be expected to function with the same or even more freedom than in the West, when the challenges and threats to political development are greater?[66] Thus, where journalists fit into developing world civil society and how they function within it may be case-specific. For example, authoritarian/totalitarian states have limited civil societies, obviously, and post-transition societies have only nascent associative structures. In transitional states of the developing world there can also be strong forces militating against the establishment of civil society. Clan, ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions may reinforce group conflict. Members of a transitional society who held social capital and the densest associative life under the old regime can use these relationships to "defend privilege and marginalize the less well-endowed majority" post-transition.[67] Although the media's function, in theory, is to break down privilege and de-marginalize the less well-endowed majority, is it able to? Or, will it, given the privileged position of members of the media themselves?

The "globalization" of civil society is one way that resistance to the development of civil society may be broken down. The media can play a role in this by enhancing communications between far-flung reaches of the globe, thereby working to eliminate isolation among states. Globalization in this context implies inevitability

[65] For example, see European Convention on Human Rights, article 10, Section 2

[66] Take, for example, Uganda where a journalist has been charged with sedition following broadcasts he made questioning the role of the Ugandan government in the death of a Sudanese politician. The sedition charges were justified by the Ugandan president as necessary to preserve regional security.

[67] Whitehead, 77.

nate isolation among states. Globalization in this context implies inevitability that civil societies will emerge within the nations of the world through the embrace of an international associative community, such as that seen in the new awareness stimulated by peace and ecological movements.[68] Whitehead sees an incipient 'international civil society' in the emerging network of "specialists, lobbyists, activists and practitioners" working with standards and operational notions about the enforcement of human rights and their linkages to democratization[69] -- a fitting description of the media trainers and NGOs supported by the Canadian government. In theory, the concept of media assistance aligns with this 'international civil society': a "fragile basis for the generation of coherent norms that could then be authoritatively implemented by international institutions."[70] Still, the application of universal journalistic norms, regardless of the institutions that are implementing them, are compelled to take into consideration the reality that the social good of free expression depends on the social context of the developing state.[71] Furthermore, the news media occupy an ambiguous space in civil society theory. It has autonomous *identity* in civil society as an associative organization with membership restricted to an exclusive group of individuals, journalists, who have their own interests and rights to protect in their relations with other players within civil society and with the government. At the same time the news media has an autonomous *function* in the sphere between the state and its citizens. Indeed, the news media are the very conduit through which many citizens interact with the state outside of citizen-bureaucracy relations. Priori-

[68] John Keane, Global Civil Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 1.

[69] Whitehead, 24.

[70] Whitehead, 24.

[71] Sheila Coronel, interview with author, 27 July 2005.

tizing issues on the public agenda, enabling the flow of official and emergency information, presenting analysis, the balancing of opinions are all tasks performed by the media in the West. It is a powerful position tempered only by legal recourse and the integrity of the individuals who practice the craft of journalism.

In the developing world the role of journalists in the promotion of democratization, good governance and civil society is far less certain than in the West. There are many factors that mitigate the function of the media. Journalists themselves may hinder political transition. Whitehead comments that under authoritarians journalists may defend the principles of legality and oppose censorship, but in "a more relaxed and liberal environment" they may champion reforms that facilitate "capture" by their colleagues or resist changes that threaten their prerogatives.[72] Given that the members of the Western news media are themselves not uniformly immune from bias, dishonest practices or from succumbing to influence, it follows that developing world journalists are not either. The tentacles of clientilism reach deep into the newsrooms of the developing world.[73] The low wages paid to developing world journalists have been identified by Transparency International as increasing their susceptibility to bribery,[74] altering journalists' function. Ownership is another important distinction to be considered when studying the news media in the developing world. To borrow an example, it may be legal for a wealthy family to establish a newspaper to discredit its enemies in the developing world but, legal or not, this practice does not fit Whitehead's definitions of 'dual

[72] Whitehead, 111.

[73] In the Philippines, for example, members of the journalistic community joke openly about the practice of 'envelopmental journalism' where payoffs from politicians to journalists in exchange for favourable coverage are commonplace.

[74] Vogl, Strengthening, 10.

practice does not fit Whitehead's definitions of 'dual autonomy' and 'civility' that define civil society.[75] A wealthy family can gain undue influence through the ownership of media because balancing mechanisms such as competition have not yet matured. The same practice in the West, however, may not violate dual autonomy and civility to the same extent. For example, in Canada the Asper family has been accused of using its media holdings to promote their political point of view. Yet they are not viewed as overly threatening to civil society. Why? First, news consumers may be fully aware of the point of views being expressed by the owners and they may even share the same point of view. Second, there is competition in the Canadian news media with an array of alternative points of view available in private and public news media.

2.2.2 The media in the promotion of human rights and peace building

Along with aiding democratization, good governance and civil society, there are two other prominent areas of political development that the Canadian government asserts media assistance can help promote: human rights and peace building.

A hierarchical ranking of human rights is an arbitrary process dependent on the unique characteristics of a given society. In a failed state the rights to sustenance, shelter and security may trump other rights of political freedom, at least until the state is on the way to political development. The promotion of human rights is also complicated by a seemingly ever-growing list of what constitutes a human right. This can lead to "paralysis" when trying to equalize rights across diverse cultures and states; rather, core rights of basic security and subsistence are more attainable

[75] Whitehead, 83.

and more relevant in many states, while the advanced political rights contained in Western-driven human rights covenants are elusive.[76] However, in a society that has overcome the challenges of security and subsistence and aspires to be democratic, pursuing the rights of free speech and access to free media is crucial.[77] The justification for the promotion of free speech and free media as fundamental to political development has been bolstered by the progress of universal human rights in the latter half of the 20th Century. Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared "freedom of speech and expression – *everywhere* in the world" (my italics) one of his four essential human freedoms in a 1941 address to the U.S. Congress.[78] In 1948, the right to free media was enshrined in Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

This declaration marks an important advancement in the theory of media development. Not only was the human right to *free speech* asserted as it had been for two centuries, but now *access* to "media" was deemed to be a human right also, echoing Roosevelt. The signatories to this declaration were committing their states to the principle of media access. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights followed the UN example in stating the right to "receive and impart ideas and informa-

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[76] Tom Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights: Canada and the Advancement of Human Dignity," in Canadian International Development Assistance, ed. Cranford Pratt (Montreal: McGill –Queen's University Press, 1994), 243.

[77] Anthea Jeffery, "Free Speech and Press: An absolute Right?" Human Rights Quarterly 18:2 (1986): 197

[78] http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs36b.htm

tion without interference".[79] In the following decades, these and other similar declarations were included in the re-working of many states' constitutions to reflect this wording and media rights advanced, albeit often slowly. As stated above, with the end of the Cold War in 1989 accelerated impetus was placed on the development of freedom of expression and freedom of information as a universal human right. To this end, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) organizes seminars on freedom of the press and independent and pluralistic media from which key reference texts have been developed and adopted by member states.[80] Access to media is a pillar of UNDP Human Development Report, Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World: A Free Independent Media.[81] Following the lead of the United Nations (UN), donor governments accordingly looked to media development as a component of post-Cold War ODA. Critics of corporate domination of the media argue, though, that the human right of access to the media should be *anti*-corporate in essence; that grassroots media should be encouraged while limits are placed on private ownership due to the increasing concentration of media ownership.[82] The debate over whether the human right of access to media is best served through private or public sector journalism is not officially engaged by

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[79] European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 10 available at: http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Eur_Convention/euroconv.html. It is noted that the European Convention also includes important caveats outlining situations in which these rights may be abrogated so, in effect, even the European states do not permit complete media freedom.

[80] United Nations; UNESCO, available at http://portal.unesco.org/. Note: UNESCO has been active in media development for many years. For example, the 1980 UNESCO document *Many Voices, One World: Towards a new, more just and more efficient world information and communication order. Report by the International Commision for the Study of Communication Problems* (Paris, 1980), also known as the MacBride report. MacBride's recommendations were a casualty of the Cold War.

[81] United Nations. UNDP available from http://www.undp.org/.

[82] Mark Rendeiro, Global Communications Governance: The Next Step in the Evolution of Human Rights, available from www.bicyclemark.org.

CIDA. Although there may be a perceived preference for supporting public sector broadcasting because present and former Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) employees have often been tasked as trainers and the CBC itself has been invited by CIDA to devise training curricula, CIDA trains and supports journalists through NGOs indiscriminately.[83] CIDA apparently does not judge whom to train.

The concept of 'peace building' in post-conflict states is another way that donors justify media assistance interventions.[84] CIDA has commissioned a study of the media and peace-building, which is useful for academics but shows limited evidence of practical application to date.[85] New York University's Center for War, Peace and News Media acknowledges that there "is not yet a substantial body of scholarship that investigates what role the media conceivably could play in preventing or ameliorating international or intra-state conflict".[86] What literature that does exist on the media and peace-building focuses on aspects such as de-escalation–oriented conflict coverage, strengthening of civil society and demolition of stereotypes and prejudice which, it is acknowledged, cannot be achieved by simply spreading a new ideology "determined by harmony and cooperative ideals."[87] Still, one finds in peace-building theory consistent rhetoric extolling the media's potential to bridge huge gaps between previously warring sides almost instantaneously, to build understanding by

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[83] Anecdotally, Canada and the European governments tend to support public broadcasting whereas the United States supports the private sector. That is the assessment of Bosnian media interventions by Canadian aid worker John Fraser who was there with NDI.

[84] Howard, 13.

[85] Government of Canada. CIDA. An operational framework for Media and Peacebuilding, available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/

[86] New York University Center for War, Peace and News Media http://www.nyu.edu/cwpnm/media_conflict.html

[87] Wilhelm Kempf, Media Contribution to Peace in War-Torn Societies, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 1998), 10.

presenting the 'other side's' point of view[88] as if long-standing animosities and historic memory can be erased by preparing and presenting revisionist documentaries on television, or holding seminars, workshops and colloquia for journalists. What seems reasonably attainable, however, is a ratcheting- down of the rhetoric associated with the media in a conflict – the side-taking tendencies inherent in developing world journalism. Studio Ijambo, a media assistance intervention in Burundi, showed that media assistance can, at the very least, strengthen the *belief* that dialogue is the only solution to resolving conflict.[89] Still, the ultimate goal of media assistance, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in a strategy document cited by CIDA as a source for its media assistance interventions, "should be to develop a range of diverse mediums and voices that are credible, and to create and strengthen a sector that promotes such outlets",[90] further illustrating the lofty expectations attached to media assistance interventions. But, as with all conflicts journalists can "either make or break the peace with what and how they report events and activities, especially in something complicated like a peace process".[91] Therefore, the assumption that media assistance strategies focusing on peace-building will yield only positive outcomes is flawed.

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[88] Norbert Ropers, "Peace-Building, Crisis Preventions and Conflict Management" in Technical Cooperation in the Context of Crises Conflicts and Disasters, (Eschborn, 2002), 65.

[89] Asgede Hagos, Media Intervention in Peace Building in Burundi – The Studio Ijmbo Experience and Impact, Washington: Management Systems International (2001): iii

[90] Government of Canada. CIDA. The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach, (1999): 3

[91] Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, Telling the Truth of the "Other": Images of Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Pasig City, Philippines: Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process 2000).

2.3 NGO Literature

The Canadian government delivers much of its ODA through CIDA via NGOs. The body of literature on NGO participation in political development is large and continues to grow as the participation of NGOs in political development expands. I limit discussion of NGO literature at this point to the intersection of NGOs with democratization, civil society and good governance promotion in contemporary context. (A later section examines more closely some of the NGOs Canada supports through media assistance interventions.) NGOs come in a wide variety of types, from fundamentally religious to rigidly secular, from apolitical humanist, to activist partisan elitist. The big multinational organizations that work in the areas of democratization, civil society and good governance promotion are well known: Article 19, Amnesty International, Freedom House, Transparency International, International PEN, Reporters Without Borders (more commonly known by the French acronym RSF), etc.[92] Domestic NGOs, including Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), are linked with their international counterparts in this loosely knit theoretical coalition called the NGO community. There are also many organizations constantly in formation or in disintegration that could conceivably be part of the NGO community and are never recognized as such.

There is evidence that the presence of an active NGO community can help promote world democratization, civil society and good governance. Where there is an absence of active governmental impetus and private philanthropy, NGOs can fill the

[92] NGOs are cited as they are used in this study. A complete list of NGOs cited in this study is attached.

gap.[93] For example, in the Philippines, where there is a vibrant civil society and a relatively high degree of media freedom and democracy, there are thousands of NGOs.[94] The Philippines is but one developing state with characteristics all its own, including a relatively open society, albeit one that faces the challenges of terrorist insurgencies and irregular turnovers of government. In more closed, even less stable societies, the delivery of ODA through NGOs is challenging. Keane sums it up: "Matters are worsened by the tyranny of distance: despite the noblest of public-spirited motives, decision-makers tend to lose track of their decisions which whiz around in a cyclotron of global structures and events with many different and unpredictable effects."[95] Consequently, the reliance on NGOs to deliver aid, though motivated by a desire to deliver aid more effectively through individuals who are more familiar with local conditions and issues than distant bureaucrats, is a policy fraught with inconsistencies. For example, how democratic are the NGOs themselves? Diamond refers to the "voice" of NGOs, but who is doing the talking? Is it the West or is it indigenous society? Is it neither? International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) may have their own agendas.[96] Critics contend that these organizations do have their own social and political motives and are often more concerned with their "own interests than in the needs of those whom they purport to serve"; in other words, NGOs exist only to self-perpetuate, and they often send ill-prepared individuals into countries they know little about.[97] Furthermore, if the grassroots are

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[93] Diamond, 252.

[94] Quigley, 272

[95] Keane, Global Civil Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 116.

[96] Diamond, 253

[97] Andreas Harsono, Aspen, 16

not even allowed a voice within their own governments, can they have a voice within the international non-governmental community? There is also much suspicion that NGOs "tend to lack the surrounding ethos, the sense of authenticity, and the spirit of autonomy celebrated by theorists of civil society".[98] For civil society to factor into the process of political development, it must be more than just a cluster of NGOs; the NGOs cannot be relied upon to assure each other's autonomy nor constrain authoritarians, writes Whitehead. Critics note also the "cycle of international enthusiasm" of NGOs. There is a great deal of attention paid to a particular crisis when it appears on the global radar screen, but some NGOs have a tendency to get involved only to move on to the next state in crisis when it occurs.[99] This undermines the long-term effectiveness of NGO intervention because a state may need long-term support to preserve the political transition. NGOs can also be competitive and counterproductive.[100] In terms of journalism, there is no internationally accepted rule-book on training; a trainer affiliated with an NGO from one country may recommend one method based on the practices in his or her country, while another may contend that another method of reporting or story-telling is the better way. Granted, the practices of journalism in Western states are similar but emphases of Western states' assistance interventions may be different. For example, in Bosnia USAID tended to promote free enterprise in the media sector (more of a libertarian model of journalism)

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[98] Whitehead, 68.

[99] Whitehead, 254.

[100] Aspen, 17

while Canada and Western European states supported public sector media (more of a social responsibility model of journalism).[101]

2.4 Promotion Strategy Literature

Although most Western nations commonly employ promotion strategies as a component of foreign aid, they can have wildly different approaches and sectoral emphases in their strategies. Studies show the European Union (EU) has traditionally provided substantial assistance to processes of democratic transition, but less for democratic consolidation; more support for free and fair elections and civil and political rights than for promoting a transparent and accountable government. The approach in the United Kingdom is the reverse. UK aid is heavily invested in the promotion of open and accountable government. Sweden concentrates heavily on human rights. The United States has the widest coverage across all sectors of democratization, civil society, and good governance promotion strategies.[102] As we will see in the next section, CIDA acknowledges that Canadian aid has been historically widely dispersed. Not surprisingly such an "indiscriminate" (as Crawford calls it) approach to promotion strategy aid is reflected in the media sector. Canada's media aid will be examined in length, below. For illustration here, I use Crawford's comparison of the EU and Sweden showing that a higher proportion of Swedish aid goes to pro-democracy groups than to media projects, and that whereas EU aid for pro-democracy groups is relatively low, emphasis *is* put on the media sector.[103] There is, apparently, no consensus in the West on which strategies work best and whether the

[101] John Fraser, correspondence author, 24 November 2003.

[102] Crawford, 43-48.

[103] Crawford, 40.

media are an important or a lesser factor in the promotion of political development. Further exacerbating the incoherence of promotion strategies among donor states is participation with or membership in extra- or super-state organizations. Western nations are therefore participating with each other in a web of interacting and overlapping governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, each with distinctive perspectives on promoting political development. Add to this the NGO community and you have more layers of bureaucracy, more layers of mission statements, more layers of objectives, of accountability, of budgeting, of measuring effectiveness, etc. to add to the existing incoherence of distinctions between each nation's foreign policy objectives. Those distinct foreign policy objectives are well-known. The United States' uses of aid for clearly political purposes in Latin America, or the UK's political aid in "reward" to Zambia and Uganda for accepting Structural Adjustments Programmes are but two examples of the political taint that lingers on promotion strategies.[104] Also, domestic politics can influence aid philosophies and application in the Western democracies. The granting of aid or the refusal to offer it to a particular developing state can become a political issue at home. How can a universal concept of plural, independent media be promoted when donor nations cannot even agree on what to promote and where?

Compounding this chaos, there are theoretical schools of scholarship that reject the concept of promotion strategies entirely. A structuralist critic might see hegemony creeping into developing states through strategies such as democratization, civil society and good governance promotion. Robinson calls promotion strategies a

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[104] Crawford, 52.

"softer tool" than the coercion used by the United States in its effort to maintain power and privilege by co-opting dissatisfaction and unrest.[105] At the other extreme, we might find libertarian critics who see no use whatsoever in engaging in promotion strategies. Criticism of promotion strategies can also be found in isolated country-specific analysis when they turn out to be failures. Rwanda, for instance, was a large recipient of democracy assistance from the United States prior to the genocide of 1994. USAID had commenced a democratization program in October 1993, just months after the ill-fated Arusha peace accord was struck.[106]

2.5 Media Assistance Literature

Assuming that in an emerging democracy each component of political development is affected by the progress of the other components of the transition, it follows that the emergence of a functioning media sector will not occur in isolation. Therefore media assistance interventions must take into consideration "the interrelationship of the media industry's many parts and why the reform of the media sector necessitates a "web" of mutually reinforcing activities, the lack of any of which can endanger any others".[107] Among the mutually reinforcing strands in this web are: the strength of civil society, the effectiveness of constitutional guarantees and the rule of law, the protection of journalists' safety, the selection, training and advancement of individuals who are committed to the goals of a free and independent news media and the willingness of government to accept the legitimate place of the media in communicating information to citizens. On the receiving end of free and inde-

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[105] W.I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US intervention, and hegemony, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6.

[106] Crawford, Promoting, 33.

[107] Government of Canada. CIDA, The Role, 5.

pendent media, the "audience" must possess the ability to critically analyze the information it is receiving. Thus, a successful intervention requires not only a sound political foundation but also a comprehension of a receiving state's technological sophistication (since it would not be of much value to promote television journalism, say, in a state that has few televisions) and awareness of the citizenry's social context (for example, is literacy at a level sufficient for the viability of effective print media? Are citizens educated to the extent that they can comprehend the function of independent media so they are not susceptible to incitement by unscrupulous members of the media?). Since there is no "universal template of press and broadcasting freedom that can be stencilled mechanically onto different political-cultural configurations,"[108] the debate over which 'rules of the media game' should transcend international borders continues. This is nothing new. The conflict that emerged in the 1970s over the concept of a global communication order nearly "crippled" UNESCO.[109] What emerged as the on-going debate over an ambiguous New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) at the United Nations is stuck in the same stalemate as many issues between the North and South are: what the role of the private sector should be in a transitional state, vis-à-vis that of the public sector. Indeed, the NWICO debate is so contentious it is held to be the catalyst for the withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO in 1985.[110] In media assistance there is no consensus on whether the news media should compete in a free marketplace of ideas, should be state-sponsored (as in a public broadcaster), or should be a blended

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[108] Vicky Randall, Democratization and the Media, (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 4.

[109] Gerbner, George, Hamid Mowlana and Kaarle Nordenstreng, The Global Media Debate, (Norwood, New Jersey, 1993), xi.

[110] Gerbner, 43.

system of both. Compounding the confusion over strategy, Price has identified two main strategic approaches to media assistance interventions.[111] One is "top- down": assistance is concentrated on creating - some might say imposing - alternative sources of information modeled on Western lines. The other approach is "bottom-up": assistance is concentrated on strengthening local, indigenous media outlets with the intent of creating a public sphere, or civil society. Both approaches come in for criticism that they are often culturally inappropriate. Specifically, the "top-down" approach may alienate local journalists who view the imposed system and institutions as foreign and even hostile to their interests. The "bottom-up" approach may lead to clashes with existing media that are partisan or non-professional.[112]

In terms of training journalists, assistance interventions are usually designed to develop the basic journalistic skill set: newsgathering, reporting, editing. Trainers attempt to 'train out' factual and contextual errors, inadvertently or one-sided or intentionally partisan reports and unreliably sourced information. Increasingly, journalistic training is focusing on the training of specific skills: investigative, financial, political, health, diversity, human rights, and conflict analysis.[113] But a consistent criticism of media assistance interventions is that such aid has had a "quick fix" mentality; that is, media assistance is delivered in one-time projects that lack the need-specific planning and patience that might ensure successful outcomes.[114] Sending in a Western journalist for a two-week stint with a food-and-travel budget

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[111] Monroe Price, Re-structuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four Perspectives, the Experience of Inter-governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000).

[112] Aspen, 2.

[113] Howard, 14.

[114] Aspen, 26.

and a whiteboard to 'teach' journalism in a developing world state - which is a common form of media assistance intervention - is not likely to yield much success if the recipient state is not advanced in other aspects of political development.

2.6 Indigenous theories of media development

Inherent in media assistance interventions is an assumption that the Western methods, standards and ethics are best when it comes to promotion strategies. That is, Western models of political development with only slight variations (such as differing structures of government, e.g. parliamentary versus presidential systems) are universally applicable if based on the fundamentals of democracy, good governance and civil society. Regarding the media, it is clear that media assistance strategies likewise mimic Western journalism: trainers train western journalistic techniques and values. This may not be the only way. There are two leading alternatives to the transfer of Western news media principles and practices to the developing world. They are: first, a blending or a fusion of Western journalism with the political culture of the developing world and, second, the emerging of an authentic indigenous journalism. Each of these alternatives is related to the concepts of development (or developmental) journalism and utilitarian journalism, especially when applying analysis to Africa. As colonies began to gain their independence, the Western news media practices put in place by the colonizers were supplanted by nationalist media. Post-colonial African leaders, often former print journalists or publishers, understood very well the power of the media and how it could be used against them. Consequently, the justification for imposing restrictions was found under the loose definition of development journalism, a term describing a concept that emerged, inter alia,

in the Philippines in the 1960s.[115] Golding lists four components of development journalism: 1. news has an educational function; 2. focus on news stories that display social needs; 3. prominence is given to news about self-help projects and, 4. journalists should tackle specific problems such as governmental corruption with "prudent obliqueness".[116] There are multiple variations on the development journalism model. Depending on the political circumstances of the individual state and the inclination of the leadership, we might add to Golding's list the far more restrictive and politically-oriented criteria of mobilizing the masses in support of the government, not practicing investigative journalism and not criticizing the government. Always under the rubric of development journalism one finds the premise that freedom of the press comes only as long as that freedom is used with responsibility. The euphemistic use of the word "responsibility" in place of self-censorship is apparent in Harbor's assessment that the common theme running through development journalism is "the lack of a watchdog function of the media."[117] In other words, there is a fine line between supporting development as a journalist and supporting the policies of the state as a journalist. Rather, Harbor prefers the term utilitarian journalism. He describes utilitarian journalism as "useful journalism or journalism that can and will serve the *genuine* (his italics) needs of Africa and Africans".[118] His list of components of utilitarian journalism overlaps development journalism somewhat, but the consistent thread in utilitarian journalism is that news media serve the needs of the community first. For instance, whereas investigative journalism is typically seen as a threat to

[115] Jefferey, 212.

[116] Golding, 303

[117] Harbor, 56

[118] Harbor, 60

governments and tends to be disregarded in development journalism, utilitarian journalism embraces investigative reporting because it may uncover corruption which benefits the community, though perhaps not the regime. The utilitarian media should also be free to criticize the government but must be cautious of trivializing democratically elected officials. The responsibility of journalists here, theoretically, is to exercise caution criticizing a democratic government at the risk of seeing it toppled and the country returned to authoritarianism. The success of utilitarian journalism lies then in identifying what a genuine need is, and who should determine it, the government or the media? Harbor comes down on the side of the media determining what a genuine need is, because the media can be checked by various means (i.e. through competition) while a dictator is responsible to no one. Scholars in this area note the complex relationships between the leaders and the led, the economic challenges to be overcome, and the historical instability, inherent in democratic transitions. But the news media can stabilize transitions by deterring instability argues Harbor, who contends that utilitarian journalism is far superior to development journalism in doing this.

The theories of development journalism and, to a lesser extent, utilitarian journalism thus relegate many of the rights-based principles of universal concepts of journalism to secondary status. What is of primary concern to utilitarian and developmental journalists is the consequence of news reporting within the community. It is a community *in* development, after all. The free-wheeling independence of Western-style journalism may be counter-cultural. Governments may tighten control of the media under developmental journalism as necessary to consolidate national

aspirations. Since utilitarian journalism is *needs*-based, in the hierarchy of developing world "needs" freedoms of speech and the rights of the media may not rank as high as others. The civil society of a transitional state may not support the status of the journalist as in the West: "[C]ivil society must be independent from the state but not alienated from it. It must be watchful but respectful of state authority; it must manifest balance between the subject and participant observations".[119] This is a subject broached by Neumayer. He suggests that civil/political rights (such as the right to an independent media) may not have the same status as personal integrity rights – freedom from imprisonment, torture and murder. Political/civil rights violations do not carry the same status, he notes. "One cannot dismiss the argument that these rights are contingent on a particular form of Western culture and that a certain amount of political/civil rights violations are somehow "necessary" for the stability of certain countries and the welfare of their people as easily as one can dismiss a similar argument with respect to political imprisonment, torture and murder".[120]

Indeed, media assistance recipient states may very well view civil society and the role of journalists much differently than we do. The incompatibility of the political culture of the developing world with the Western concept of journalism and its guarantees of freedom and independence established over centuries, crusader identity, and adversarial tendencies, is a contentious point of theoretical debate. Golding writes of how the impartial, objective, analytical and non-partisan view of politics espoused in principle by Western journalists is not likely to prevail in the developing

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[119] Diamond, 252.

[120] Eric Neumayer, "Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocations?" Social Science Quarterly 84: 3 (2003): 650 – 652.

world because, "the market and work situations compromise any possible institutional neutrality, so that modern and traditional communications remain 'wedded to social and political processes'".[121] Here he is saying that the social and political culture of the state may make it impossible for Western news media principles to be applied. Individually, the developing world journalist may not be able to fully embrace Western journalistic principles either because of convictions that pre interprets his or her reporting. The journalist cannot detach. Gurevitch makes the point that despite the principle of ostensible detachment in the practice of Western journalism, all journalists "are active participants of the world they report on rather than observers of that world".[122] Objectivity may be impossible. However, the Western concept of journalism strives for objectivity, in principle -- even if it is likewise impossible to achieve in the West. The manifestation of this is seen in the principles of "balanced" and "fair" coverage wherein both sides of an issue are ostensibly covered within the confines of a story, within the editorial opinions espoused in the pages of a newspaper or in the broadcast media, or in the balance that should occur when there is competition between independent media outlets for the minds of news consumers. To be realistic, what occurs in the West is at best a semblance of balance. Moreover, what Whitehead calls the "impersonal irresponsibility" of modern commercialized mass media, could also lead to "majoritarian incivility".[123]

In the West news consumers must check the media against their personal values. There are also competitive media in the West where news consumers may find the

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[121] Golding, 301.

[122] Gurevitch, 215.

[123] Whitehead, 84.

type of journalism that reflects their values, ethics, and cultures. Developing world news consumers may have less ability to check the veracity of the news media because of illiteracy and poor education, or because of state intervention in the competitive balance. Harsher critics find more flaws in the transfer of Western news media practices and principles than simply a Western square peg not fitting into the round hole of the developing world. More than just a bad development fit, they argue that the promotion of media principles is breeding a dependence of a kind that harkens back to the criticism of 50s and 60s developmental theory.[124] This critique implies that the transfer of Western news media principles and practices is not merely unfeasible and possibly detrimental to political development, but that the news media are a tacit device of Western hegemonic expansion.

2.7 The myth of plural media

Media assistance interventions may also transfer standard practices of the Western news media, which may in fact inhibit political development as well. Newspapers and newscasts have deadlines: a press run is at a certain hour, as are television newscasts; deadlines limit the time a reporter has to gather plural voices; news stories have lengths and must fit into the overall timing of the newscast. Again, these are limitations – limitations to the gathering of multiple opinions and contributions in the West and in the developing world. These practices, which enforce standardized story-telling, have been transferred to the developing world.[125] Newscasts and newspapers are structured the same way in the developing world as in the West. Stories in the developing world are now often told the same way

[124] Golding, 292

[125] Personal observations of the author, and evidence found in observing such developing world broadcasters as Al Jazeera, confirms that the format of broadcast media has been transferred.

they are in the West, generalized with a tendency to balance issues into black and white comparisons. More than the limitations imposed by stylistic confines of the Western media model though, achieving plurality takes time and is unlikely to be attained through promotion strategies alone. However, even when plural media exist, individual choices and decision-making may limit the extent to which alternative opinions and points of view are assimilated individually. Individuals may seek opinions that conform to their ethnic group's opinion or to their community's opinion, while individuals belonging to other sects or faiths within the very same state may seek diametrically opposed opinions that bolster their own; examples here include Lebanon and Bosnia. Models such as Whitehead's metaphor of political transition as a kind of theatre, assume a degree of homogeneity among the audience (populace), which may not be the case. Whitehead himself acknowledges that polities are usually "heterogeneous, dispersed, easily distracted and attend only selectively to parts of the ongoing political narratives."[126] Media theorists conceive of a "public space" -- the space where those affected by general social norms and collective political decisions can have a say in the formulation, adoption and stipulation of procedures.[127] But this communication may run up against background convictions in states that consist of multiple cultures: "Participants find the relations between the objective, social, and subjective worlds already pre-interpreted"[128] because "communicative actors are always moving within the horizon of their lifeworld; they cannot step outside of it".[129] Also, there is simply a limit to how many media an individual can consume. How many newspapers, websites, and radio

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[126] Whitehead, 61.

[127] Seyla Benhabib, in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), 87.

[128] Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2. Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 125.

[129] Habermas, 126.

and television programs could one read, watch or listen to on a given day, even if one had the financial resources to access a wide cross-section of opinions? Plurality is consequently difficult to attain. There can also be detrimental consequences to the pursuit of wide-open plural media. In a developing world media marketplace such as the Philippines the competition for listeners is so intense in the radio medium that the standards of journalism sometimes fall to the way-side; inflammatory and unfounded allegations are often broadcast in order to attract audience.[130] Again, theory does not always match reality: although plurality is possible, it may not be attainable or even desirable. Additionally, due to low rates of literacy and education, even where genuine plurality exists news consumers may not possess the same capacities to discern a point of view in the media as their counterparts in the West can. Furthermore, I suggest a counter-intuitive criticism of the media that has received little analysis, namely, that confusion can ensue from plurality. Modeled as they are after Western media, public and private news organizations in the developing world often run, hour after hour, day after day, analysis and interviews which leads to a fatigue within the public and a situation where the audience tunes out rather than tuning in to issues.[131]

Such is the theoretical environment in which Canada attempts to assist media development. Since recipient states are diverse, democratization, good governance and civil society promotion strategies are not universally applicable templates. The media as a tool to enhance human rights and build peace are questionable. The role of NGOs in media assistance, while pivotal, is open to debate. Finally, the very model of Western-style media is potentially harmful, given the unique characteristics

[130] See example: Philippines for elaboration, below

[131] Observations of the author in the Philippines, Summer 2005, during the crisis over President Arroyo's tampering with the 2004 election.

of Western-style media is potentially harmful, given the unique characteristics of the developing world, with plurality perhaps unattainable. Building on this, the next chapter explores in detail Canada's objectives and the outcomes of media ODA.

Chapter 3: Canada and Media Assistance

Canada's foreign policy is firmly rooted in liberal internationalist and liberal institutionalist traditions. Many Canadians continue to identify with individuals such as Lester Pearson, tasks such as peacekeeping, and the role of playing the helpful fixer of agreements, such as the Ottawa Protocol on land mines. In justifying foreign aid, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) frames international assistance not as *noblesse oblige*, but rather that ODA helps to ensure Canadians' wealth, prosperity and security.[132] In doing this Canada strongly supports international institutions such as the United Nations and its agencies, engages in liberal international trade regimes such as the WTO and NAFTA, and shares principles of other Western states as espoused in the UN Millenium Declaration and in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) documents.[133][134] Today the Canadian government subscribes to the principle that access to plural independent media is a universal human right. In practical terms, plural independent media are also held by the Canadian government to be a building block of political development. An examination of CIDA's relevant documents shows, however, that media assistance, while apparently a highly regarded component of ODA, is most often appended to other strategies and goals, as opposed to standing alone strategically.

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[132] See Department of Foreign Affairs website available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/menu-en.asp

[133] Government of Canada. CIDA Canada Making a Difference in the World; A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, Hull (2002): 1

[134] Government of Canada. CIDA, Making , 4

3.1 Canadian Foreign Aid

Since media assistance is a subset of Canada's overall ODA strategy, the examination of Canadian media assistance interventions begins with a review of Ottawa's overarching rationale in providing foreign aid. The literature on Canada's modern ODA strategy is extensive and dates back more than fifty years. Assuming that the present manifestation of foreign assistance strategy is built upon the designs of and lessons gleaned from previous strategies, it is instructive therefore to first review briefly the history of Canada's foreign assistance.

The concept of post-World War II foreign assistance that emerged following the Commonwealth countries' January 1950 Colombo Conference was clearly designed to be in large part a bulwark against the spread of communism.[135] Prime Minister St. Laurent confirmed as much in a March 1950 speech promoting the use of foreign aid as an "intangible way" to help win the Cold War.[136] In a seminal review of Canada's post-Colombo foreign policy "A Samaritan state? External aid in Canada's foreign policy" Spicer confirms the primacy of the anti-communist motivation for aid in the 1950s, especially aid for Southeast Asia. The strategy behind the "anti-communist aid thesis" was threefold, Spicer suggests: first, aid promotes liberal democracy; second, aid gives donors significant control over a recipient's foreign policy by attaching conditions to aid; and third, aid creates goodwill.[137] Yet, in assessing the fifteen years of anti-communist aid strategy Spicer concluded there was "no proven relation

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[135] Canada's delegation to Colombo in 1950 included, among others, Lester B. Pearson and Escott Reid, who were to become influential foreign policy decision makers through the 1950s and 1960s.

[136] St. Laurent speech available from http://www.collectionscanada.ca/primeministers/h4-4015-e.html.

[137] Keith Spicer, A Samaritan state? External aid in Canada's foreign policy. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 24.

between external aid and the flowering of liberal democracy".[138] Nonetheless, the design of Canada's ODA strategy carried the imprimatur of the 1950s into at least the late 1960s. Regarding specific project emphases, the 1950s and 1960s were a period of large infrastructure investments as opposed to the kinds of interventions we see today. But in the 1960s focus changed incrementally. The large infrastructure investment gradually declined in importance while education, for example, became more of a priority. The creation of CIDA in 1968 formed the new organization through which the changing goals of ODA were to be realized. A shift "reflecting a new concern to reach and help the poorest" in the 1970s[139] coincided with increasing attention paid by Canada's assistance strategists to a "panoply of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights" stemming from Ottawa's commitment to international covenants such as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.[140] There was a relationship between poverty reduction and civil and political rights, it was argued, because a population denied these rights, especially the poor, cannot freely participate in the economic decisions that affect them.[141] Of pertinence to this study, the mid-1980s were an important period of change in Canada's ODA design. The trend away from geo-strategic selection was reinforced in the 1988 "Sharing Our Future" strategy document, the first review in nearly two decades. Foreign aid acquired a distinctive policy status with a more specific role and salience, whereas previously

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[138] Spicer, 28.

[139] Pratt, 9.

[140] Keenleyside, 240

[141] Keeleyside, 242

it had been an adjunct instrument of international politics and trade.[142] Emphasis shifted to sectors aiding human resources development and economic and financial assistance as infrastructure projects declined in importance.[143] These are sectors ideally suited to the format of media assistance interventions applied today. Sector shift was mirrored by a shift in tactical emphasis to knowledge transfers, skills upgrading or strengthening institutions through, among other methods, training.[144] Furthermore, 1987 is seen to be an important transitional year, with human rights assuming a greater role within aid policy.[145] As well, greater emphasis was put on "country focus" in an attempt to permit flexibility in choosing appropriate channels for aid delivery.[146]

Upon review, it can be seen that these historic changes and developments in ODA design come together in Canada's media assistance strategies today: media assistance *is* designed to aid in the promotion of liberal democracy (one of the earliest and most consistent goals of Canadian ODA); media assistance *is not* a 'large infrastructure investment'; media assistance *is* based on universal concepts of human and political rights development; media assistance *is* a human resources development strategy; media assistance *is* a knowledge transfer; media assistance strategies *do* concentrate on training; and, lastly, as we will see below, media assistance strategies *are* 'country-focused'.

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[142] Martin Rudner, "Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy: Process, goals and priorities," Canadian Journal of Development Studies 12 (1991):13

[143] Pratt,. 9.

[144] Rudner, 24.

[145] Keeleyside,, 250.

[146] Pratt, 95.

Where are we now? Despite failing to achieve the desired .7 percent of GDP, Canada is still a major donor of foreign assistance in real dollar terms. As of 2003, Canada ranks 10th among the 22 members of the OECD's DAC at $2.03 billion (USD) in net ODA spending. Canada's ODA budget is roughly .24 percent of GNI.[147] As for the motivation behind Canada's foreign aid, Canada is less politically motivated than the United States and the United Kingdom. As a political tool, ODA has been used by Canada over the years as a reward for political development. Alternatively, the withdrawal of aid has served to influence political outcomes, but the record in this area is "halting, inconsistent and ambiguous".[148] An example of this in a media context was the termination by Canada of a line of credit extended to Guyana to buy Canadian newsprint because the opposition press was not granted access to paper.[149] Even this example is specious, however. Although the provision of a line of credit for newsprint can be defined as media assistance, its impact on political development is dubious. After all, newsprint can be acquired elsewhere and it can still be denied to the opposition press, especially if the opposition press has limited financial resources. The withdrawal of media assistance is therefore not a very useful punitive tool. Utilizing media assistance as a reward to a pro-reform government is only marginally more useful, given that such aid rarely goes directly to the government. As we shall see below, most media assistance is aimed at indigenous NGOs which benefit the government little. Indeed, even reform-minded governments may care little if indigenous media NGOs get assistance from Canada.

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147 OECD – DAC available from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/52/34352584.pdf

148 Keenleyside, 245.

149 Keenleyside, 248.

As for expectations vis-à-vis outcomes, Neumayer places Canada in a group of "like-minded countries", along with Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden, who are commonly regarded as committed to human rights in their ODA distribution. He shows, however, that the "like-minded countries do not fare better as a group than the other donors in spite of usually being portrayed (not the least by themselves) as committed to the pursuit of human rights."[150] Doubt is often cast, however, on the assumption that aid is an altruistic tool of foreign policy of the middle power states, "most notably Canada and the Nordic countries".[151]

In summary, the changes and permutations in Canada's foreign aid strategy over the past fifty years underlie several of the contentious issues surrounding media assistance today. Over time Ottawa's retreat from project development and delivery of aid has put increasing decision-making power into the hands of NGOs. Media and journalistic NGOs have consequently risen to the fore and remain a potent force in media assistance ODA. The broadening of the recipient base has opened the door to interventions across a diverse set of countries, similar in some ways, but potentially quite different in conditions of development. The shift in emphasis from large infrastructure projects in a few select countries, to social and political development along with the promotion of human rights across a wide spectrum of countries and conditions is strategically nebulous. It comes as no surprise, then, that the subset of media assistance reflects in microcosm the criticism leveled at other aspects of Canadian foreign aid strategy: unfocussed and too widely dispersed.

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[150] Neumayer, , 663.

[151] Peter J. Schrader, Steven W. Hook and Bruce Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows," World Politics 50 (1998): 320.

3.2 CIDA

The creation of CIDA marked a watershed in Canadian foreign assistance. CIDA's inception distinguished foreign assistance from other aspects of foreign policy by giving ODA status and identity within its own dedicated agency. However, even today CIDA and its parent, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), often overlap each other's mandate in the area of media assistance.[152] But in the main, because CIDA is the funding organ of Canadian ODA, it is the focus of this study rather than DFAIT.

Corresponding to the spirit of the times, early documents confirm that ODA delivered through CIDA was still more heavily concentrated in areas of infrastructure development and relief of immediate crises such as famine than in areas such as the development of democracy, civil society and good governance. Projects such as water delivery, sanitation, aid for energy generation are prominently listed in CIDA's early reports. Within a few years CIDA is clearly changing tack. While infrastructure development and crisis intervention were still important for CIDA in the early 1970s, the development of "human resources" gained increasing importance, such as the concept of media assistance. For example, more than sixty Senegalese students were trained in journalism in 1976 by CIDA; in 1977, 150 scholarships in journalism in Niger were funded by CIDA.[153] Over the next twenty years CIDA's focus changed in response to political directives and funding contingencies. At the end of the Cold War, CIDA was funding far less the types of infrastructure and economic projects that defined the agency's early years and concentrating more on aspects of human

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[152] For example, DFAIT has sponsored media training in Kenya.

[153] CIDA 1976 Annual Aid Review, Information Division of the Communications Branch, CIDA, Ottawa, November 1977, 21.

and social development. This is the paradigm that prevails today in CIDA, as illustrated by an emphasis on civil society promotion. For example, the 1996 "Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization, and Good Governance" lauds the principle of promoting civil society: "The government's approach to rights, democracy and governance, expressed in these CIDA objectives... emphasizes organizations in civil society as key vehicles for articulation popular concerns and channelling popular participation in decision and policy making".[154] This is confirmed in a 2002 policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness.[155] CIDA, as Canada's main agent of ODA project selection and delivery, follows DFAIT's lead in spreading aid widely. At present, CIDA supports hundreds of organizations, projects and linkages with international institutions. The trend, however, is to focus aid strategy more clearly. The 2002 policy statement "Canada Making a Difference in the World" reinforces the principles of good governance, building capacity and civil society, which emerged as consistent themes in Canadian aid policy through the 1990s, as did the promotion of democratization. In acknowledging that Canada has consistently been one of the least concentrated of Western donor countries in terms of dispersing aid, the policy takes steps to narrow CIDA's focus. This can be seen three ways:

- Refining the principles of effective development. The refined principles include local ownership, whereby recipient countries must develop their own development strategies if they are to be sustainable, improved donor coordi-

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[154] Canada. CIDA. Policy, 3.

[155] Canada. CIDA. Making.

nation and coherence, and a results-based approach, with improved monitoring and evaluation of development programs.[156]

- Emphasize "programmatic" forms of support versus "project" forms of support. Program-based approaches "give more emphasis to comprehensive and coordinated planning" in sectoral or thematic programs, particularly in areas of poverty reduction, per the Millennium Declaration.[157] Working through NGOs with the governments of recipient states on Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) CIDA's intent is to better coordinate strategic approaches. A premium is placed "on local ownership and donor coordination" that embodies a comprehensive approach to development.[158] These are program-based initiatives. Projects, on the other hand, CIDA concedes "were often implemented with insufficient regard for the broader context which could affect, or undermine, their impact".[159] Furthermore, project delivery of aid can lead to a piecemeal and uncoordinated approach to development. In other words, CIDA was admitting that perhaps too many projects (and NGOs) had been supported in the past and aid too widely scattered.

- The third method of narrowing focus is to specifically target countries or regions for aid. Aid to nine target countries has been increased, at least temporarily. The nine countries are Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Hondu-

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[156] Canada. CIDA. Making, 4.

[157] Canada. CIDA. Making, 6.

[158] Canada. CIDA. Making, 7.

[159] Canada. CIDA. Making 6.

ras, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal and Tanzania.[160] The past Minister of International Cooperation, the ministry responsible for CIDA, confirmed in the spring of 2004 that this nine country focus was still viable and was being pursued as development policy by CIDA.[161] Beyond the nine-country focus, CIDA is also targeting the continent of Africa for specific aid.

"Canada Making a Difference in the World" clearly connects progress in political development as a long-term determinant of which countries will continue to receive Canadian ODA. Noting the uneven process of democratic transition in Africa, praise is reserved for democratically-elected leaders in countries such as Senegal, Uganda, Tanzania and Botswana, who have "signalled clearly their commitment to positive change and are taking action in this respect".[162] Poor countries that demonstrate "efforts to improve governance... end corruption and make effective use of aid monies" will be selected for "enhanced partnerships" and receive a greater share of incremental funds.[163]

Regarding specific news media development programming, "Canada Making a Difference in the World" is silent. It addresses urgent social issues by setting out four priority sectors: health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, basic education, and child protection. Gender equality is to be an integral part of all four priority areas.[164] The fact that news media development is not specifically mentioned in "Canada Making a

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[160] Government of Canada. CIDA. New Canadian Investments in Nine Developing Countries (news release) 20 December 2002

[161] Susan Whelan, past Minister of International Cooperation in response to a question from author on at the University of Windsor. October, 2003.

[162] Canada,. CIDA. Making, 24.

[163] Canada. CIDA., Making, 12.

[164] Canada. CIDA. Making. 13.

Difference in the World" does not mean that media assistance is no longer one of CIDA's strategies. In the absence of a White Paper on Canadian ODA, we can assume that previous strategies are valid unless they have been repudiated. Tracing back CIDA documents reveals that media assistance has long been part of Canada's strategy of promoting good governance, civil society and democratization in the developing world. For example:

- Building "the role of and independent, responsible media through training, technical assistance and linkages between journalists" was listed in 1996 as one of the types of intervention that CIDA views as supporting human rights, democratization and good governance objectives.[165]

- According to CIDA, a strong democratic society will be characterized by "an active independent media" among other factors such as tolerance of dissent and an independent judiciary.[166]

- The media is one of the organizations in civil society with whom CIDA will work "to achieve the objectives of the Government policy".[167][168]

Lloyd Axworthy, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, singled out "free and vocal media" in 1997 as part of the infrastructure of "Peacebuilding" along with a civilian police force, and an impartial judiciary.[169] The development of free and independent

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[165] Canada. CIDA. Rights, 7.

[166] Canada. CIDA. Rights, 14.

[167] Canada. CIDA. Rights, 9.

[168] Canada. CIDA. Making, 1.

[169] Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and human security: the need for leadership" International Journal, (Spring 1997): 187

media was and remains an integral component of Canadian foreign policy objectives as part of both political and social development.[170] Clearly, CIDA asserts the media can help to hold a government accountable, aid in transparency, educate and inform, advance democratization and build peace. The many-faceted functions, roles and expectations of media assistance interventions are reflected in CIDA's funding documents. There is no single category under which media assistance is broken out. Rather, media assistance is distributed across several categories, sectors and programs. For instance, CIDA funding through Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE) for the installation of a printing press in Sierra Leone in 2001 is distributed through the CIDA Peacebuilding Fund.[171] More specifically, the $288,000 committed for this project's *priority* allocation is "civil society's policy role" (Code 0404). The *sector* allocation is "free flow of information" (Code 15065).[172] But previous funding of $96,621 in 1995 through CJFE to a project titled, "Promoting Democracy in Cambodia through media development" has no designated priority allocation at all, while the project's sector allocation is "education policy and administrative management" (code 011110).[173] In 2002, CIDA committed $100,000 for a journalism training initiative in Thailand. Like the Sierra Leone project, the sector allocation is "free flow of information". Yet, $20,000 of this funding is also allocated to the "strengthening civil society" sector (code 015050) and the project's priority allocation is similarly split between "gender equality" (code 0202) and "democratic insti-

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[170]Evidence of this is seen as recently as February 2005 when DFAIT sponsored a regional workshop on investigative journalism in Kenya.http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nairobi/news-2005-03-07-en.asp

[171] CIDA Update September 2001 Issue 2

[172] CIDA Reporting: Project M010408 – Peace and Democracy through Media 5

[173] CIDA Reporting: Project S049509 - Promoting Democracy in Cambodia through media development/promoting democracy in Cambodia through media development 13

tutions and practices" (code 0402).[174] In these examples, although the priorities and sectors noted are closely related and not necessarily contradictory, the allocation of funds for similar projects across different priorities and sectors hinders the task of sorting out what is spent where, on what. Accordingly, it is difficult to measure effectiveness when projects that appear strikingly similar are listed under different sector and priority envelopes. This is compounded further by the fact that single projects, such as the 2002 Thailand intervention, target multiple priorities and sectors, with funding split accordingly.

But in moving from the theoretical to the practical in terms of good governance, we see evidence that aid may never be spent where it is intended. Goldfarb contends that Canada "gives more of its bilateral development aid to countries perceived to be highly corrupt than to those that are less corrupt."[175] But it should be recalled here that the advancement of democratization, the development of civil society and good governance is a long-term process. Aid may consequently end up in states with worse corruption problems than states further along in their political development.

3.3 The media NGOs

CIDA's preferred method of distributing ODA for media projects is through NGOs.[176]

The shift to project-based and sector emphasis in the 1980s led to an increase in the funding for NGOs and the role they play in the delivery of aid. As well, NGOs brought issues such as gender and human rights to the attention of CIDA during this

[174] CIDA Reporting: Project S062017: Building Democracy/Journalism in Thailand 19

[175] Goldfarb, 2.

[176] Use of NGOs is a common method of distributing ODA in all Western states, ie. Sweden. Source: Crawford, 52

period and began to drive project selection through the "free trade" in ideas between bureaucrats and the NGOs. NGOs were also utilized as the public face of Canada's ODA.[177] This trend to delivery of aid through NGOs was further entrenched under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney as a response to limited resources available for foreign aid projects through the 1980s and 1990s. It also delegated more operational control to NGOs in order to decentralize program responsibility, the government thereby getting out of the business of running programmes in order to play a more strategic role. Even as CIDA contemplates putting more of its own staff boots on the ground in the developing world again, since NGOs remain the delivery agents of aid and providers of content and project staff, it does not seem likely that the role of NGOs will diminish. The 2002 "Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness" recognizes "the important role of non-state actors as deliverers of development assistance (and) advocates of social and political change within the developing world".[178] In terms of media assistance the following table lists some of the organizations that have received funding from CIDA to work in the area of media assistance since 1990:

Table 1. NGOs distributing CIDA media assistance ODA

Alliances des Radio Communautaires du Canada
Alternatives Inc.
Association Mondiale des Radiodiffusseurs Communautaire
Canadian Executive Service Organization
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE)
Carleton University
Centre International de Solidarite Ouvriere
Commonwealth Association of Journalists

[177] Pratt, 95

[178] Canada. CIDA. Making.

Co-Development Canada
CUSO
Developing Countries Farm Radio Network (DCFRN)
Foundation for International Training Third World Countries
Infact Canada
Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society
Inter-Press Services
Oblat Missionaries
Organization Catholique Canadienne pour le Developpement et la Paix
Oxfam
Reseau Liberte
Solidarite Union Cooperation
Transparency International
United Church of Canada
University of Western Ontario
Vues D'Afrique
World Bank (partial list)[179]

As the above list indicates, a diverse array of NGOs are funded under the rubric of media assistance. Religious organizations and universities are mingled with journalistic NGOs. Canadian NGOs working in media assistance also overlap with each other and aid each other's work. For example, DCFRN staff members have served on the board of CJFE. CUSO has recently begun working with DCFRN. The media NGO community's relationship with CIDA is also symbiotic: sometimes CIDA approaches an NGO seeking its participation in a project; other times, the NGO approaches CIDA with a project proposal.[180]

3.4 Analysis of Canadian Media Assistance Interventions

This study is overwhelmingly a qualitative analysis. The justification for this is threefold. First, the purpose of this study is to examine the overall purpose, design and success of Canada's media assistance strategy within the confines of a Master's

[179] Canada. House of Commons Library.

[180] Arnold Amber, President, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, conversation with author, 27 July, 2004.

level dissertation; the breadth and scope of data collection required for a comprehensive quantitative analysis is simply not possible here, given the disparities among developing world states that receive media assistance ODA from Canada and other Western states.[181] Second, using conventional methodology for evaluating assistance for political development seeks "a technical solution to a political problem".[182] For example, even though the Saudis have a high number of communication devices per capita, their polity can hardly be considered free.[183] Statistics are therefore not always a useful indicator of political development, given that the penetration of media can be wildly unequal.[184] Third, in focusing only on data, a subtle turning point may be missed because the evidence of a turning point may simply not be quantifiable. As the Danish government discovered in a study of its ODA from 1990-1998, even with quantifiable data the causal linkages are found to be tenuous at best.[185] Indeed, recognizing the weaknesses of quantitative assessment at the national level, USAID in 2001 reversed the course of its 1998 *Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program* Indicators, which emphasized quantitative analysis, to concentrate on qualitative indicators on country or sectoral case study bases.[186] CIDA has traditionally employed a logical framework approach (LFA) to evaluation (a logical sequence is traced from activities to outputs/outcomes) called results-based management (RBM),

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[181] A quantitative analysis may be an intriguing avenue for future research. Developing and testing an index of variables that affect the outcomes of media assistance interventions could be useful for policy makers deciding where and when to intervene.

[182] Crawford, Gordon. "Promoting Democracy from Without – Learning from Within (Part II)", Democratization (10), 2.

[183] Transparency International rates Saudi Arabia as a "not free" state with low levels of political and civiil rights.

[184] Sreberny-Mohammadi, 195.

[185] Specifically Guatemala; Crawford, Part I, 90.

[186] Crawford, Part II, 81.

similar to USAID's 'managing for results' (MFR) in using a performance framework (PF) and a performance measurement framework (PMF). A PF anticipates cause-and-effect relationships from the level of activities upward to the strategic goals, while the PMF is a systematic plan for measurement and verification through performance indicators and data collection.[187] The limitations to this approach, with its emphasis on quantitative measurement are not lost on CIDA. "Blueprint-type projects" have been recognized as fitting poorly in complex developing world states; causality in governance programming can be rejected because "there are too many variables at play".[188] Crawford rejects logical framework analysis too: "The (pseudo)-scientific approach is unable to cope with the dynamic political context in which DG (democracy and governance) activities are embedded... evaluating democracy and governance assistance is more art than science."[189] CIDA's most recent commentary on the monitoring of its aid effectiveness is contained in the *Measuring Results* section within "Canada Making a Difference in the World". It is stated that, regarding the eight Millennium Development goals,[190] Canada will rely on United Nations statistics and assessments to monitor progress. In other aspects of aid funding, "Canada Making a Difference in the World" notes that measuring effectiveness must reflect the transition that is occurring in aid policy from project emphasis to programme/country level emphasis.

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[187] Crawford, Part I, 79.

[188] Crawford, Part I, 82.

[189] Crawford, Part I, 86.

[190] The eight Millenium Declaration goals are: 1. eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2. achieve universal primary education, 3. promote gender equality and empower women, 4. reduce child poverty, 5. improve maternal health, 6. combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 7. ensure environmental sustainability, and 8. develop a global partnership for development. Source=http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/

But if we cannot analyze the process of political development through empirical data and test our conclusions, can these conclusions be considered valid? Is qualitative study so fraught with subjectivity that such an analysis is itself invalid? A 1996 report for CIDA acknowledges the dilemma: "the principally qualitative nature of political change has tended to make analysts shy away from attempts to measure or quantify (political development)".[191] Yet while qualitative comparisons may yield ambiguous data the advantage qualitative comparisons possess is flexibility in assessing the varied outcomes and the unequal nature of transitions. Besides, insisting on standardized outcomes regardless of context of resources is both historically and culturally insensitive.[192] Ideally, quantitative and qualitative measurements of human rights and democratic development are then "used in tandem".[193] However, a strictly qualitative analysis is open to criticism of selectivity bias.

3.3.1 Collection of Data

There are four sources of data used in this study. The first set of data was gathered at the Parliamentary Library of the House of Commons through a subject search of media ODA projects. This search yielded extensive data. After sorting these documents, specific representative country and NGO data were selected for analysis. A second set of data was gathered through the information branch of CIDA: a refined search based on the representative country and NGO date acquired from the Parliamentary Library was personally submitted to the information branch of CIDA in Hull,

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[191] Ilan Kapoor, Indicators for Programming in Human Rights and Democratic Development: A Preliminary Study for the Political and Social Policies Division Policy Branch, (Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, 1996), 1.

[192] Whitehead, 13.

[193] Kapoor, 1.

Quebec, which yielded a second collection of documents. Cross-referencing the data from the two searches confirmed ODA spending through NGOs selected for analysis. A third set of data was acquired through elite interviews with journalism trainers, members of the news media, civil society, the NGO sector and government. The fourth set of data is an accumulated body of news releases, journal and newspaper articles which serves to buttress the data from the other three sources. In order to make comparisons, this study utilizes the indices of internationally recognized NGOs that work in the area of political development: Freedom House, Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders, Article 19, Transparency International and others where noted. From this data, the charts and tables were composed.

3.2 Data

Source documents indicate that these countries have received Canadian media assistance of some kind since 1990:

Afghanistan NF~ Bangladesh PF~	Congo NF~	Kenya PF+	Senegal F+
Benin F~	Cote D'Ivoire NF-	Philippines F~	Serbia F~
Bolivia PF-	Cuba NF~	Rwanda NF~	Sierra Leone PF+
Bosnia PF+	Djibouti PF+	Mali F~	Slovakia F~
Botswana F~	Ecuador PF~	Malawi PF-	Somalia NF~
Burkina Faso PF~	Egypt NF~	Nigeria PF+	South Africa F~
Cambodia NF~	Ethiopia PF~	Nicaragua PF~	Sudan NF~
Chad NF~	Georgia PF~	Peru F+	Tanzania PF~
Chile F~	Guatemala PF~	Poland F~	Thailand F~
	Iraq NF~	Russia PF-	

(F = Free; PF = Partially Free; NF = Not Free. ~ = no change; + positive change; - = negative change over past ten years: data from 2004 Freedom House Annual Report.[194] Note: In mid-2005, Freedom House downgraded Russia to "Not free" status indicating that the 2005 Annual Report will list Russia as NF. The media on the island of Zanzibar in Tanzania are highly restricted.)

The vast majority of media interventions were in Africa (20), seven interventions were in Latin America, six were in Asia, and six were in Europe. The distribution reflects compelling political circumstances: immediately following the break up of the Soviet Union, all forms of aid poured into the former Soviet satellites, e.g. Poland. Likewise, the disintegration of Yugoslavia demanded interventions in both Serbia and Bosnia in the mid-1990s. Russia's regression in some areas of political development continues to attract the attention of the international community. The most recent interventions in Africa and Asia reflect the on-going challenges and irregular development of states in each of these regions and perhaps Canada's stated intention of focusing increased aid on Africa. Of the above list 12 of 39 are consid-

[194] Freedom House data available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/index.html.

ered free, 16 partly free and 11 not free. Therefore, 27 of 39 or 69 percent are not considered free even after media assistance interventions.[195]

The amount of media assistance funding committed by Canada varies wildly. The following chart indicates some of the Canadian media assistance funding received by select countries.

[195] Although Freedom House does compile a Press Freedom Ranking and this study is an examination of media development, Freedom House's composite index is used to indicate the progress of overall freedom in individual states, because media freedom is influenced by other factors, and freedom of the media also influences overall freedoms within a polity.



Just as funding to individual countries varies wildly, Canada's funding to NGOs and other organizations is unequal. The following chart shows Canadian ODA for media assistance distributed through select organizations since 1990:[196]

Figure 2: Major NGO/IGO recipients of media ODA (Canadian $)



(DCFRN: Developing Countries Farm Radio Network; CJFE: Canadian Journalists for Free Expression; IPS: Inter Press Service; IMPACS: Institute for Media, Politics and Civil Society)

These charts show the scale of Canada's media assistance. They tell us two things: first, we can see which countries and which regions have received the largest share of media ODA. Second, the chart above shows that Ottawa on the one hand distributes media ODA to Canadian NGOs disproportionately, on the other hand it also commits large amounts of ODA to multi-national organizations such as the World Bank. These charts are useful in drawing attention to the prominent organizations and to the states/regions that are large re-

[196] May not be a comprehensive list. Figures drawn from available CIDA documents.

cipients of media ODA. They do not show us the unique characteristics of an intervention, the situation of the recipient state at the time of the intervention and the recipient state's continuing development, or the circumstances surrounding the timing of the intervention itself. As well, looking only at Canadian data does not take into consideration the assistance, or the lack thereof, from other sources that may have influenced the outcome of the transition.

3.3 Analysis of Data

As stated above, the analysis of data in this study is used qualitatively to find a relationship, if any, between Canada's media assistance interventions and political development rather than a quantifiable equation predicting political development. This study uses two types of examples, drawn from data, above, in qualitative analysis: first, an analysis of selected organizations that work in the area of media assistance and receive Canadian media ODA; second, select examples of countries that have received Canadian media ODA. The findings and discussion that emerge from these examples are discussed in chapter IV.

Example #1 – Organizations: World Bank, DCFRN, CJFE

The World Bank is a multi-lateral institution funding a wide number of programs with the intent of promoting good governance in developing world states, specifically in tackling corruption. One of the ways of aiding governments to root out corruption, according to the World Bank, is through effective media.[197] Canada, per its historic support for multi-lateral institutions, supports the World Bank in these ef-

[197] http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/PSGLP/0,,contentMDK:20282843~menuPK:461615~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSitePK:461606,00.html
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTCEERD/0,,contentMDK:20275208~menuPK:548814~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:542906,00.html

forts, including a grant of $400,000 to "promote professional awareness of the issues of corruption and a sense of commitment to and responsibility in investigative journalism; to encourage self-regulation in the journalism field through the development of appropriate codes of conduct; and to strengthen the regional capacity to deliver additional Investigative Journalism Workshops through partner organizations, including the Nigerian Guild of Editors and the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association."[198]

The Developing Countries Farm Radio Network (DCFRN) is a Canadian NGO that provides radio agricultural educational scripts for partner-broadcasters in the developing world. Occasionally these scripts address socio-political issues, such as child labour and women's rights, which can be contentious.[199] Thus, while DCFRN is not a journalistic NGO *per se*, it engages in a kind of current affairs journalism that permeates the civil society of a state by addressing these issues. Media assistance of this kind may have inadvertent consequences.

Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE) is a Canadian NGO active in the promotion of free speech and free media. It is selected because, unlike the World Bank and DCFRN, CJFE is clearly a journalistic NGO: it trains journalism and supports the advancement of free speech and journalism through various endeavours. The origin of CJFE dates to 1981 when the Canadian Association of Journalists, then known as the Centre for Investigative Journalism, created a committee dedicated to campaigning against the kidnapping, torture and murder of journalists throughout Latin America. This committee became the Canadian Committee to Protect Journal-

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[198] CIDA News Release available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/

[199] DCFRN scripts available from http://www.farmradio.org/eng/scripts.php#subject13

ists (CCPJ) which, in turn, evolved into the CJFE. CJFE now also manages the freedom of expression clearing house, The International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX).[200] CJFE is an advocate for free speech and journalists' rights around the world. It aids journalists in distress and those who have been exiled from their homelands, and it has operated media rebuilding and training interventions on behalf of CIDA. Since 1993, CJFE has been involved in the following interventions:[201]

Year(s)	Country/countries	Budget
1993	Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru	$15,000 each
1994	Malawi	$88,360
1995	Cambodia	$96,621
1999	Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria	$12,000 each
1999	South Africa	$32,000
2000-2002	South Africa	$85,000
2000-2002	Sierra Leone	$288,000 (2 years)
2002-2004	Sierra Leone	$140,000 (2 years)
2002-2004	Thailand	$100,000 (2 years)
	Total	$952,981

[200] http://www.cjfe.org/eng/about/about.html`

[201] From Parliament of Canada Library and CIDA archives

Additionally, CJFE receives on-going funding to sustain its activities. For example, CJFE received $80,000 in 1999 in sustainability funding from CIDA.[202] Including sustainability funding, the above list of CIDA disbursements shows that at the minimum more than one million dollars has been granted to CJFE since 1993. The following chart shows the course of political development in the five countries that received the single largest amounts of aid through CJFE, based on Freedom House rankings (0= Free; 10= Not Free)[203]:



Of the five countries selected, South Africa has shown the most progress in the transition to a free society. Thailand has shown promise but remains mired at a level Freedom House considers only partially free. Sierra Leone, while only partially free according to Freedom House, is advancing in fits and starts. Cambodia has occasionally made advances yet is today not free. Malawi is clearly showing a trend away from the advancement of freedom. In terms of press freedom specifically, in 2004 Freedom House lists South Africa as free, Thailand, Malawi and Sierra Leone as

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[202] CIDA intranet reporting

[203] Freedom House is an internationally recognized NGO working for the advancement of democracy and freedom around the world. Freedom House publishes an annual index of freedom in the world available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/index.htm. The above chart

partly free, and Cambodia as not free.[204] Each of these countries is examined more closely, below.

Example #2 – recipient country analyses:

This set of examples is broken down into regional blocs for easier comparison.

Africa

1. Nigeria

Nigeria has long been a target of Western news media ODA. For example, in 1951 the British Government donated to Nigeria the mobile beachhead transmitter used by the BBC to report on the invasion of Normandy in World War II.[205] It was a transfer of technology -- albeit seven-year-old technology. Nigeria has been the subsequent target of Western media training initiatives for many years. In 1961, during the height of the height of orthodox development theory, the Jackson College of Journalism at the University of Nigeria was established with a US-style curriculum.[206] A generation of Nigerian journalists was consequently imbued with Western journalistic principles. Given this record of Western involvement in the development and promotion of Western media, Nigeria thus provides the opportunity to examine an on-going, long-term transition. It is pertinent to this study because of the afore mentioned CIDA grant to the World Bank.

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[204] Freedom House 2004 Press Freedom ranking available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey/

[205] Goldin, 305.

[206] Golding, 298.

Today, Nigeria is listed by Freedom House as only partly free. The following chart, based on Freedom House rankings, shows the progress of freedom in Nigeria since 1973 (0= Free; 10= Not Free):[207]



As the chart indicates, Nigeria's record of progressing toward free speech and media rights has been inconsistent. Notice also that Nigeria's media ranking has slipped since CJFE's 1999 intervention after showing initial promise of progress toward media freedom. At present, RSF notes that in Nigeria, "Police violence against journalists continued. Despite a slight improvement, press freedom was still precarious in the north of the country. The authorities also have their sights on the foreign news media."[208] Wracked through its post-colonial history by internal conflict and coups d'etat, after a brief period of political development in the early 1980s Nigeria regressed in the 1990s. Nigeria continues to grapple with many of the same issues today. Officially, Nigeria has historically supported freedom of expression. A guarantee of it was included in the 1960 Bill of Rights. However, freedom of expression has neither been viewed as necessary nor significant in the development process in

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[207] Freedom House data: http://www.freedomhouse.org/index.htm

[208] http://www.rsf.org/country-36.php3?id_mot=551&Valider=OK

Nigeria.[209] As a result, critical reporting was often viewed as being in opposition to development.[210] Development of Nigerian civil society has been harmed by the decades of political turmoil. Professional organizations remain weak. Assassinations of politicians and officials still occur. Variations on Sharia law are in effect in Nigerian states with Muslim majorities. Religious conflict, especially between Muslims and Christians, hinders political development. In terms of progress toward good governance, Nigeria is the second most corrupt country in the world on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, beating out only Bangladesh for the world's most corrupt state.[211] It is this weak spot in Nigeria's development that CIDA appears to be targeting in the 2002 contribution to the World Bank Institute: "The project will create a corps of up to 280 Nigerian journalists and editors who take a keen interest in investigating and uncovering corrupt practices in the public and private sector, in a professional and balanced manner".[212] Nigeria has a promising foundation for journalistic development: its mass media is second only to South Africa in size and complexity within the African media context. More than one hundred radio and television stations operate in the country.[213] However, the practice of journalism is fraught with danger. Journalists are harassed and threatened, including through

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[209] Robert Martin, "Freedom of Expression in Africa" in Communicating Democracy. The Media and Political Transition., ed. Patrick H. O'Neil (London: Rienner , 1998), 69.

[210] Martin, 69.

[211] Transparency International available at www.transparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.en.html

[212] Canada. Cida. Available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/

[213] Louise M. Bourgault, "Nigeria: The Politics of Confusion," in Communicating Democracy. The Media and Political Transition., ed. Patrick H. O'Neil (London: Rienner , 1998), 91

religious fatwas.[214] The current president, Olusegun Obasanjo, appears to be responding to international pressure and is cracking down on corruption.

3. South Africa

Of the CJFE's interventions, South Africa is perhaps the most successful. South Africa made a peaceful transition to democratic government post-Apartheid and it remains a democracy which has passed the test of peaceful turnover. We can see in South Africa a number of indicators that appear to be closely tied to political development and the progress of plural independent media. Data tell us that South Africa has one of the highest rates of literacy and education in Africa (Adult literacy = 86%; 89% complete primary education; 119th on HDI). It is the economic engine of southern Africa. In terms of leadership, the role of Nelson Mandela cannot be over stated. The charisma and dignity of this individual established an important example to the nation. The transition in South Africa was also aided by other strong leaders. F.W. de Klerk led the white community through transition to black, majority rule. Desmond Tutu headed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. South Africa has a strong civil society that includes COSATU, the congress of South African trade unions, and a network of professional associations and community groups. The international community is deeply engaged in the South African political transition. There has been sustained multi-sector commitment to political development. In addition to giving media assistance, Canada has funded South African constitutional development, provided support for the judicial system including the training of

[214] http://www.article19.org/

judges, and governance aid.[215] The transition of South Africa has also been aided by a heavy commitment and clear focus of Western governments to the process of peaceful reform at all levels of political development, the media being but one.

5. Sierra Leone

"The government continued to look askance at the independent press. Corruption was still a taboo subject and the few journalists who dared to write about embezzlement within the state apparatus paid the price."

~RSF Sierra Leone 2004 Annual Report[216]

Of the five CJFE interventions selected for examination, Sierra Leone is the most recent to make a transition. Peace was reached in early 2002 ending a decade-long civil war. A 17,000 member United Nations peacekeeping force succeeded in disarming 70,000 rebels and a war crimes court is seeking to bring the worst perpetrators of atrocities in the civil war to justice. CIDA supplied the funds for CJFE to buy a press in Canada and transport it to the Sierra Leonean capital, Freetown, a press from which fifteen small newspapers are printed. In a follow-up project, CJFE has supplied bicycles so that delivery boys can haul the papers beyond the confines of the capital's core because CJFE realized the papers were not getting out of the capital or even to the wider edge of the capital.[217]

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[215] Canada. CIDA. Available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/

[216] http://www.rsf.org/country-36.php3?id_mot=521&Valider=OK

[217] Amber, interview with author.

But Sierra Leone is beset by many challenges that limit the spread of a plural and independent media. For one thing, illiteracy is very high outside of Freetown, which limits the penetration of the print media. Sierra Leone ranks last on the UNDP's HDI; 74.5% of the population live on less than two dollars a day.[218] Given the very recent emergence of Sierra Leone from civil war, the UNDP has not yet been able to note a trend in the human development index. In terms of press freedom in Sierra Leone, RSF states that "The press is free as long as it does not poke its nose into anything troublesome. This seemed to sum up the government's position on free expression. Corruption was by far and away the most sensitive subject. Whenever a journalist tried to denounce embezzlement or fraud involving senior officials, the authorities used and abused everything in their judicial arsenal to fight back."[219] During the civil war, journalists were killed with impunity. Today, journalists in Sierra Leone continue to be harassed, attacked and imprisoned. A radio commentator recently ran afoul of a tribal chief, who closed down the station he worked for.[220] Amnesty International notes in a 2004 report that despite some progress in rehabilitating the national justice system, "serious problems persist in the effective administration of justice. There were few incentives for qualified lawyers to become judges. Although magistrates' courts were restored to all 12 districts, lack of magistrates remained a major constraint. Justices of the peace were trained and deployed to help reduce lengthy backlogs of cases. Criminal suspects continued to be held in police custody beyond legal limits, often because of lack of legal representation, especially in the

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[218] UNDP statistic available at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_12_1_1.html

[219] Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF) surveys available at http://www.rsf.org/

[220] RSF available from http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15031.

provinces."[221]

6. Malawi

"There has been recurring violence against journalists for several years, and the authorities have not always punished those responsible. But they did promise to stop arresting journalists."

~RSF Malawi Annual Report 2004[222]

CJFE's intervention in Malawi occurred at an important turning point in Malawi's transition. After twenty years of one-party rule under Banda, multi-party elections were held in 1994. Today, Malawi is beset by social and political problems. Its economy remains predominantly agrarian. HIV/AIDS and malaria are serious challenges. There continues to be political tension between the current president and his predecessor, who tried but failed to stay in office through constitutional change. The current president, Bingu Wa Muthurika, has split with his former political party over resistance to his efforts to fight corruption. Malawi is 165th out of the 177 countries on the United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI).[223] Worse, Malawi has begun to trend downward since 1995, after ascending in the HDI for twenty years. Malawi has plummeted in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. From a high of 43rd place in 2000, Malawi is mired in 2004 in the 90th place.[224] There have been improvements in literacy (1990=51.8%

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[221] Amnesty International reports available from http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/sle-summary-eng.

[222] RSF surveys available from http://www.rsf.org/country-36.php3?id_mot=547&Valider=OK.

[223] United Nations Human Development Index available from http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/indices/.

[224] Transparency International rankings available from http://ww w.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi.

ages 15 above literate; 2002=61.8% ages 15 and above literate) but the percentage of children reaching grade five has fallen dramatically between 1990 and 2002 (1990=64%; 2002=54%).[225] Amnesty International notes that in 2004 there was an "overall decline in freedom of expression" as well as harassment and imprisonment of journalists.[226] Malawi is regressing not only in speech and media rights but also in political and human development. From a promising start to political transition in the early 1990s, Malawi appears to be reversing course as the above chart indicates. What has happened? Arnold Amber, the President of CJFE and a television producer with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) worked as a trainer in the Malawi intervention. Amber acknowledges failure in the Malawi project which, he says, was due to the government's failure to ensure the rights of the media. "The government wouldn't let the broadcaster be more liberal and y'know, you only sometimes find out the true intent of the people when you're already in the training program." Amber recalls that the Minister of Information in Malawi at the time of the intervention was himself the owner of a newspaper. Amber considers this to be a flagrant violation of the separation of the media and the state.[227] "The people in Malawi said, you train us and we'll be more liberal. It turned out they weren't more liberal at all."

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[225] UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/cty/cty_f_MWI.html

[226] http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/mwi-summary-eng

[227] Arnold Amber interview with author

Middle East

1. Iraq

The long-term viability of plural independent media in Iraq is obviously in flux. Under Saddam Hussein there were no free speech and media, only government mouthpieces and the Ba'ath party propaganda machine. With the removal of Saddam and US occupation, independent media have flourished. There are now more than one hundred newspapers being published and numerous radio and television stations on the air. Indeed, the United States boasts that it has given Iraqis free speech along with the other rights denied to them for decades. It is in this void that Canada hopes to advance plural, independent media with a $500,000 grant to IMPACS to:

> "assess the role of Iraqi media within Iraq and the Middle East and propose programming for ongoing collaboration with Canadian media to enhance, strengthen and further professionalize Iraqi and regional media. The initiative includes a three-day intensive training program for Iraqi journalists to expose them to basic journalism, including future reporting on elections processes. The initiative will help shape longer-term media development programming for the region".[228]

IMPACS is collaborating in the Iraq project with another member of Canada's media NGO community, Montreal-based Reseau Liberte.

With regard to examining specifically the impact of the media in political development, the access to free and independent media appears to be partly or wholly out of the reach of the government. Consequently, it is difficult to discern if the failure to achieve such rights is due to neglect or malevolent government activity, or if other societal factures such as poverty are to blame.[229] RSF calls Iraq a very serious situation, having been unable to issue an Iraq annual report since the fall of Saddam Hus-

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[228] Canada. CIDA. Available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vPrintNewsReleaseEn/

[229] Neumayer, 652.

sein. The general lack of security threatens all Iraqis but journalists may be targeted because of what they do and the high visibility the profession demands. The sectarian nature of Iraq, which is apparent in the dispute over the makeup of the governing council and constitution, could hinder media pluralism. In a state where there are strong sectarian divisions and the state media are not trusted, the individual who does not seek alternative points of view may stay within the confines of his or her community's media. Shi'a may be inclined to read Shi'a newspapers, watch Shi'a TV and listen to Shi'a radio, thereby receiving information and editorial opinion that are not plural. The same may go for Sunni and Kurds, which is a cultural/linguistic group rather than a sect. This has been confirmed by IMPACS.[230] A Middle Eastern example of this sectarian split can be seen in Lebanon, where the secular supporters of the late Rafik Hariri tend to watch his family's television network while supporters of Hizb'Allah watch that organization's news, information and cultural programming. The state media are not relevant. The NGO Index on Censorship issued a December 2004 report titled, "Options for Media Development in Iraq"[231] In it, Index on Censorship notes that the instability in Iraq poses both tremendous reward and immense risk. To date, Canada's media assistance intervention has shown no impact on media development in Iraq.

Asia

1. Thailand

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[230] Michel Comte, Michel, National Post, 28 March 2005, A9

[231] Index on Censorship report available from http://www.indexonline.org/en/pdfs/iraq-media-development-international.pdf

Thailand has shown promise in the progress in political transition, including free speech and media rights since the military handed over power to civilians in 1992. However, there are indications that political development is regressing in Thailand, with speech and media rights leading the decline. RSF refers to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as the Asian equivalent of Italy's Silvio Berlusconi. Shinawatra and Thai armed forces own several radio and television stations.[232] RSF declares that there are noticeable problems in Thailand's media: "(The Prime Minister and the armed forces) tried to silence their most vocal critics. But the privately-owned Thai and English-language media are resisting."[233] The print media in Thailand have been, until recently, one of the freest in Asia but, as in other parts of the developing world, journalists are killed and harassed in performing their duties. Shinawatra's recent domination at the polls has turned Thailand into a virtual one-party-state which may threaten its youthful democracy. Conflicts with Cambodia and unrest in the Muslim south of the country have led to the imposition of martial law, denial of rights and censorship of the media. This is an obvious retreat from the glowing situation described by CIDA just last year.[234] Indeed, there has been a further decline in media freedom in Thailand of late. Shinawatra makes no secret of the fact that he believes media should "serve the country"; the result has been that to appease the government more than twenty news editors have been fired, re-assigned or had their work modified between 2001 and 2004.[235] In July, Shinawatra was granted the power to impose outright censorship on media in the country's south, leading the Thai Journalists' As-

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[232] RSF survey available from http://www.rsf.org/country-50.php3?id_mot=266&Valider=OK.

[233] RSF survey available from http://www.rsf.org/country-50.php3?id_mot=266&Valider=OK.

[234] Canada. CIDA. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/

[235] Sam Zarif, Globe and Mail, 19 July 2004

sociation to declare that the Thai media now faces its greatest threat in modern history.[236]

2. Philippines

Although Canada is not currently aggressively intervening in media assistance in the Philippines,[237] past interventions have supported the work of indigenous NGOs such as the Philippines Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) and Canada presently participates in the political transition of the Philippines on many levels.[238] As a developing world state that is nearly twenty years into a political transition following the overthrow of Marcos in 1986, the Philippines provides useful comparisons with media assistance interventions currently underway.

The Philippines has among one of the freest news media in Asia. There are few restrictions placed on journalists by the state and there is a healthy investigative ethic led by groups such as PCIJ which are ostensibly dedicated to uncovering corruption and ensuring transparency in government. However, Filipino media are beset by a number of challenges. Ownership of the media rests in the hands of the wealthy. A few dominant families' ownership crosses the barrier between print and electronic media. News coverage overwhelmingly concentrates on the political grievances and disputes in Congress, which is likewise dominated by the wealthy and the scions of prominent Filipino families. Many of the issues confronting the masses of Filipino

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[236] BBC News 19 July 2005, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetoold/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/469579.stm

[237] Canada currently funds the annual McLuhan Award to a Filipino journalist. The award provides for travel and accommodation in Canada for three weeks each year to study Canadian journalism available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/manila/statspik/2005-01-05b-en.asp.

[238] Recent support for the elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/manila/statspik/2005-08-12-en.asp

poor are dealt with sparingly. Also, there are two distinct journalistic communities in the Philippines. The urban media, in large cities such as Manila and Cebu, do not face the same challenges as their colleagues in outlying provinces. Journalism is a dangerous occupation outside the large cities. By mid-August, six members of the media had been assassinated in 2005 alone. Since 1986, more than fifty members of the media had lost their lives because of their work.[239] Not all of these members of the media are truly journalists, however, despite the description of them as such by well-meaning journalistic advocacy organizations. Rather, they are high- decibel commentators who flout the law and journalistic convention. As for legitimate journalists, many of them do not have formal journalistic training, which contributes to a lack of professionalism. Also, journalists are poorly paid, a situation exploited by politicians who engage in "envelopmental journalism" --payments of small amounts of cash for favourable coverage which is an accepted practice outside of large centres. Other forms of payments are made in large urban areas.[240]

3. Cambodia

"Cambodia was viewed as the good boy of South-East Asia as regards press freedom. Violence against journalists and censorship became more and more infrequent. Nonetheless, almost all the broadcast media were controlled by the associates of

[239] Rachel Kahn, Director, Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, Makati, Philippines, interview with author 27 July 2005.

[240] Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, Professor, University of the Philppines, Mindanao. Interview with author 23 August 2005.

Prime Minister Hun Sen. These media gave limited space to the opposition in the municipal elections of February 2002."[241]

Cambodia is a repeat recipient of Canadian media assistance. Not only has CJFE provided training assistance to Cambodia in 1995 (see table), IMPACS received a $300,000 grant to provide media training there in 1999. That is nearly $400,000 dollars granted to two different media assistance NGOs in a five-year period yet, as the graph illustrates, Freedom House continues to rank Cambodia as not free. The country's legal system was decimated by the Khmer Rouge to the point where there are few lawyers, while judges are ill-trained and highly corruptible.[242] Amnesty International calls Cambodia's justice system "disastrous", replete with secret trials and confessions extracted through beatings by police rushing to judgement.[243] In terms of social development, Cambodia ranks 130th on the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI)[244] but is making slow but steady progress in raising its HDI since the UNDP began tracking Cambodian development in 1995.[245] Literacy is 69.4 percent (age fifteen and above) and GDP per capita is $2,060 (USD).[246] Regarding the current state of Cambodian media, it would appear, looking at statistics, that the country has the foundation for plural media. RSF notes that Cambodia has 260 newspapers, 37 radio stations and 43 TV channels, 21 of

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[241] RSF Cambodia 2003 Annual Report available from http://www.rsf.org/country-

[242] Transparency International rankings available from at http://www.transparency.org/newsletters/99.2/reports

[243] Amnesty International survey available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/

[244] UNDP statistics available fromhttp://www.undp.org/

[245] UNDP statistics available from http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_12_1_1.html

[246] UNDP statistics available from http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/cty/cty_f_KHM.html

them accessible by cable. However, according to RSF, "the ruling party is second to no one in controlling and manipulating the media on its behalf. The prime minister and his allies control seven TV and radio stations."[247] Opposition parties and journalists are murdered, threatened and harassed, with the anemic legal structure siding with complainants against the media. The Cambodian government does not, however, appear openly hostile to NGO intervention in the media sector. Last year, Article 19 held it's first-ever freedom of information workshop in Cambodia.[248] Regarding aspects of good governance, Transparency International is also working openly in the country.[249]

Europe

1. Russia

Media freedom in Russia has declined to the point where Freedom House has downgraded Russia's ranking to not free this year. There are many reasons for this, according to RSF: "Government efforts to take control of the media and curb press freedom were accompanied in 2002 by imprisonment, new restrictive laws, huge fines threatening the survival of newspapers, arbitrary closures, searches and seizure of just-printed newspapers. The targets were media and journalists who were too independent or critical of the authorities."[250] Of late, Russian authorities have simply denied visas to foreign reporters seeking to enter the country, reflecting a bold and

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[247] RSF surveys available from http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10159&var_recherche=cambodia

[248] Article 19 Quarterly Newsletter (Autumn 2004) available at http://www.article19.org/

[249] http://www.transparency.org/newsletters/2002.2/country_work.html#cambodia

[250] RSF 2003 Russia Annual Report available from http://www.rsf.org/country-

growing disregard for any semblance of media freedom in Russia – a model which is being copied in the former Soviet republics to the south.[251]

2. Bosnia

The news media in Bosnia, although free, are not plural. As noted previously, where there is strong sectarian division, the likelihood of individuals reading, viewing or listening to the "other's" media is less than in a unitary state. That is the case in Bosnia. Also, the state-controlled media have frequently countenanced biased reportage at the urging of Western, in particular US, advisors. This has led some commentators to criticize the entire premise of media assistance:

".... there is more than a slight danger that the Bosnia model of media control may become the norm in future nation-building enterprises. One can hardly imagine a better way of engendering cynicism and anger toward the West among the populations of target countries. The lesson being conveyed is that the West's real definition of freedom of the press is the freedom to air views favored by Western authorities."[252]

These examples are selective. A comprehensive index of all post-Cold War media assistance interventions may indeed yield success stories. However, the creation of such an index is not the purpose of this study. Rather, this study seeks to uncover failures of media assistance interventions in contemplating the reasons for failures – to challenge the assumption that free, independent, plural news media are attainable

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[251] Committee to Protect Journalists; http://www.cpj.org/regions_05/europe_05/europe_05.html

[252] Ted Galen Carpenter, "Jackboot Nation Building: The West Brings Democracy to Bosnia," Mediterranean Quarterly 11.2 (2000): 11.

and a universal principle of political development. Some of the reasons for the failures of media assistance interventions are noted in the findings and discussion, below.

Chapter IV: Findings and Discussion

4.1 Description of Findings

The finding most easily arrived at, is that Canada's media assistance interventions yield highly inconsistent outcomes. Although this study is not a historical analysis of all Canadian media assistance interventions, it is obvious interventions that yield clearly positive outcomes are few, many recipient states show neither progress or decline of media rights and access post-intervention (which may be interpreted as failures, assuming that an intervention is undertaken because of the dismal state of the media to begin with), and some states have clearly regressed. Why outcomes are inconsistent can be attributed to many factors.

A key factor may be that Canada simply spreads its media assistance ODA across too many countries and NGOs, and expectations are too broad. Attempting to advance the media in more than 39 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America since 1990 is bound to pose challenges of devising consistent programming and outcomes given the diversity among states. By relying to such a degree on multiple NGOs, which may have distinct mandates, for intervention design and delivery, decision-making is one step removed from policy-making. This distance is further exacerbated when funding is handed over to a non-Canadian organization such as the World Bank. As illustrated by the examples in 3.2, media assistance falls into multiple priorities and sectors – media assistance seems to be expected to accomplish too many goals.

Another factor explaining inconsistent outcomes may be that the underlying premise behind media assistance interventions as they are currently conceived is flawed. Corresponding with Whitehead's contention that insisting on standardized outcomes regardless of context or resources is both historically and culturally insensitive,[253] the assumption that there is a template of basic journalistic norms that can be universally applied ignores the diverse realities of developing world states. Recalling that even in the West the media are themselves constantly undergoing change while checked by long-standing laws, regulations, ethics, social mores, and advanced political structures, a weakness or breakdown in any of these aspects in a transitional state can easily affect the success of media assistance interventions. Drawing upon the above examples, some of the more salient aspects of political development that have affected the success of media assistance interventions follow.

Power, Carrothers contends, is the "missing link" of democratic development.[254] Media assistance cannot be fully effective without understanding the power structure of the state into which the aid is going. Power in the hands of an enlightened leader may lead to political development. In the hands of another leader, power may hinder political development. The success of a media assistance intervention depends on the power relationships in the recipient states. A leader's inclination to promoting media freedom is a determinant. Related to this, a leader who has the ability to use the media to his or her advantage may be more tolerant of an independent media; one who has difficult relations with the media may tend to control or restrict journalists, or favour lapdog reporters. As Whitehead reminds us, "[T]he most essential aspect of

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[253] Whitehead, 13.

[254] Crawford, Part II, 3.

political leadership is the capacity to persuade – and perhaps inspire – others".[255] In democratic transitions, when the political changes may be immense, citizens need to be "guided, reassured and persuaded by convincing and authoritative leaders". In such situations, leaders who master the range of performance arts, particularly in the modern electronic media, may use the media to advance political development. The example of Yeltsin climbing on a tank in front of the Duma in 1991 is one of the "open and unstructured performances that are often required in the course of democratic transitions".[256] Mandela, de Klerk and Tutu were pivotal in managing South Africa's political transition this way, it seems; their leadership may have left a legacy of tolerance and openness reflected in South Africa's media today. Malawian leadership, on the other hand, has shown little inclination to developing free and independent media. The decline of media rights and access presently in Thailand and Russia seems to coincide with the ascension of leaders with autocratic tendencies. The absence of support for independent media at the top is apparently directly related to the failure to advance media rights and access. Consequently, is an intervention in a state where leadership has no inclination to advance media rights money well-spent?

Even in a state where the leader is inclined to support a liberal journalistic environment, weak 'linkages' may hinder successful media assistance interventions. Crawford, borrowing from Schmitter and Brouwer, uses the concepts of 'micro', 'meso' and 'macro' linkages. This is a useful guide for studying media assistance. 'Micro' is the local level of programming, such as the training of journalists. 'Meso' is the sectoral or thematic level of programming (the level most often over-

[255] Whitehead, 43.

[256] Whitehead, 43.

looked in the "tendency to jump directly from micro-level impact analysis to judgments about impact on national political change"),[257] which might include the development of journalistic support within civil society. The 'macro' level of linkage is national impact, for example, aiding in the development of meaningful constitutional guarantees of free speech and free media and the rule of law surrounding journalistic rights. Crawford argues his three-level methodology, by including the 'meso' stratum of evaluation, finds the "missing middle" or the linkage that is often missing in studies that "tend to assume rather than to prove the impact of individual projects on the entire process of democratization".[258] In this comparison, the success of a media assistance intervention may depend on the linkages between levels. A 'micro' level intervention may fail because there is no support at the 'meso' and 'macro' levels. South Africa has received extensive, long-term support for its judicial institutions from the international community and has a strong indigenous civil society (such as an active union movement), suggesting healthy linkages within which a free media can flourish. Canada has supported judicial development in Cambodia along with its media assistance, yet media development is irregular suggesting a breakdown in linkages elsewhere. In the Philippines, although civil society is lively and NGOs are active across the entire spectrum of political development, journalists in outlying areas are threatened with assault, if not assassination. An enduring patron-client regime and unequal power distribution of other kinds, as well as unique problems within the journalistic community itself, challenge journalistic development there. A mostly dysfunctional political system and a culture of impunity in which the rule of

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[257] Crawford, Part I, 5.

[258] Crawford, Part II, 87.

law is defied clearly hinder journalistic development in the Philippines and elsewhere in the developing world. Media development cannot occur on its own: it requires linkages across the political spectrum, or at least, strong linkages in key areas such as law and civil society.

All things being equal, the social development of a state at the time of intervention appears to have an impact on the success of media assistance as well. Plural independent media in a state that has, say, high illiteracy and low levels of education, will be more difficult to achieve in a culture that has higher levels of literacy and education. The examples show that there may be a correlation: South Africa has relatively high levels of literacy and education; Cambodia less so than South Africa in each of these areas; Malawi has relatively low levels of both literacy and education compared with other states. Data such as this may tell us whether a print intervention has a chance to succeed, or whether a broadcast intervention would be better, or if a media assistance intervention of any kind has a prospect of succeeding. We can also use data to tell us other conditions of a recipient state: Is it corrupt? Is it poor? These are factors which may influence the success of an intervention. But data is limited in what it can tell us about a political transition. It alone cannot tell us everything. Media assistance interventions are often latent. To be fair, the end of the Cold War unleashed a series of political events that were unpredictable, and arguably remain so. This uncertain aid environment poses a dilemma: in some cases, media assistance interventions target blank-slate states emerging from decades of conflict such as Sierra Leone. On the other hand, interventions target states such as Nigeria – a long-term beneficiary of media assistance. The dilemma lies in

reconciling nuances of strategy which, to be fair, CIDA attempts to do: in Sierra Leone CIDA is trying to build the basic foundations of journalism, whereas in Nigeria CIDA is attempting to advance journalism to the next stage, to build upon an existing foundation of journalism by trying to foment a culture of investigation among journalists and, therefore, root out corruption and advance good governance where it is lacking. Regardless of design, in either example interventions are following political events that have, evidently, drawn CIDA's attention. Otherwise, CIDA – or more aptly the NGOs, would not be there. In a sense, then, media interventions in both these examples play catch-up to political events, positive or negative; they are latent.

Not only might media assistance interventions be late, a consistent criticism of media-freedom advocates in the developing world is that Western media assistance interventions also lack sustainability; they are not long-term interventions. The data from CIDA confirms that funding is mostly small and projects are of short-duration. If they are to succeed, media projects must therefore be not only designed better in terms of who gets aid but they must also be sustained. Howard writes of how the 1993 establishment of Radio UNTAC in Cambodia "induced competitive media, which was credited in the massive, reasonably democratic vote", only to see Cambodian media revert to its partisan form when Radio UNTAC was disbanded when the UN mandate ended.[259] As illustrated above, Canadian media aid has subsequently flowed to Cambodia (in 1995 and again in 1999 – an example of repeat intervening) with little apparent impact on political development. If 1993 was a high point in

[259] Howard, 21.

Cambodia's recent political development, perhaps momentum toward free media and associated political development could have been sustained if donors had only more intently stayed the course. Effective promotion of the media requires much more than a one-time commitment of funds for projects such as a turn-key transfer of technology, or a training seminar.

Another finding specific to Canada's aid objectives is that Canadian media assistance interventions do not seem to follow CIDA's designated list of nine countries targeted for specific concentration listed above in 3.2. Rather, CIDA funds media assistance on a haphazard basis: sometimes the impetus for an intervention comes from NGOs, sometimes CIDA suggests to NGOs which countries should be targeted by NGOs.[260] Other times, CIDA grants money to multinational organizations such as the World Bank, which detaches funding from Canadian control. How CIDA selects countries for media assistance is not made clear in CIDA documents. Much criticism of CIDA has concentrated on its wide dispersal of all forms of ODA. CIDA itself acknowledges that aid is spread widely: "Canada has consistently been the least concentrated of all the donor countries of the DAC. In 1999-2000, the top 15 recipient countries of Canada's aid program received 15.8 percent of Canada's total ODA. The donor country average was 25 percent and no other donor country gave less than 20 percent of its aid to its top 15 recipient countries."[261] Since Canada's funding for media assistance, like other aspects of Canadian ODA, is relatively small and spread across many states it is difficult to ascertain whether media interventions are effective, given the scale of Canada's assistance. Consequently, the outcome of a project -

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[260] Amber, interview with author..

[261] Canada. CIDA. Making

its success or failure - may be anomalous rather than part of a larger trend. The emphasis should perhaps then lie in the "input" stage, that is, in the closer selection of states for intervention, especially if one accepts that outcomes are dependent on linkages. But in selecting countries for intervention, CIDA does not appear to employ a clearly defined programmatic approach to media assistance. This may in itself reflect the small scale of Canada's media intervention – that since assistance is negligible anyway, why bother establishing a programmatic approach?

Clearly, many assumptions about the efficacy of media assistance interventions do not match outcomes. For example, the Canadian NGO IMPACS was commissioned by CIDA in 2001 to develop a framework for the media and peace building.[262] It is an impressive academic document, replete with typologies of interventions and useful indicators of crises. It also includes the boast that IMPACS "since 1998 has strengthened democracy in Cambodia by assisting in the development of more independent, open and accountable radio journalism in the highly subjective and fractious media environment there."[263] Yet, as noted above, Cambodia's record on free speech and free media hardly supports the contention that media is free, independent and open in the country. As recent as July 2005, the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) issued a memo protesting a crackdown on free speech in Cambodia.[264] The rhetoric of NGOs must be viewed with skepticism.

Finally, Canada's media assistance falls into a void of accountability. Media assistance interventions are not closely assessed for their effectiveness. Data on spend-

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[262] An operational framework for media and peacebuilding; available at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/

[263] Canada. CIDA. Available from (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/

[264] Inernational Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) alerts available from http://www.ifex.org

ing can be acquired, which is the foundation for this study, but it is ambiguously categorized. There is not coherent analysis of media assistance outcomes. This may be due to the fact that the amounts of money are trivial: does a $12,000 grant to CJFE in Nigeria really make a difference? Or, does $500,000 (not a trivial amount, certainly) spent in Russia actually advance the progress of media rights in a country as vast, with an economy so large? CIDA seems due for a comprehensive analysis of media assistance interventions.

4.2 Summary

This study is not a rejection of media assistance entirely. It may be that Western media assistance interventions can aid the progress of political transitions in the developing world. As Wiarda notes, "indigenous, home-grown ideas and models of development proved to be (except perhaps in east Asia) no more effective in actually promoting development than earlier theories had been, and they were often downright harmful".[265] However, there are flaws within the current conception of Western media assistance interventions, primarily that interventions are isolated from each other (e.g. governments may not coordinate efforts even though they are active in the same countries), the reality of interventions do not correspond with funding governments' assumptions (e.g. there appears to be an assumption that media assistance works without actual evidence that it does), interventions are often isolated from the cultural distinctions of recipient states (e.g. that Western journalistic practices may not be universal) and lastly, interventions are isolated from the factors that contribute to the establishment and sustainability of an effective and reliable media, notably the

[265] Howard Wiarda, "The Western Tradition and its Export to the Non-West," in Non-Western Theories of Development, ed. Howard Wiarda, (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt, 1999), 3.

professionalism of journalists themselves and the actual conditions within recipient states. The list of even the minimal enabling conditions can be very long. The afore mentioned 2001 Aspen Institute conference lists fourteen such conditions that must be promoted so that independent journalism can gain a foothold in a developing state.[266] For the sake of brevity I summarize them here into four categories:

- journalistic professionalism
- enabling legal and legislative infrastructure
- meaningful protection of these rights, sustained by rule of law.
- Security of journalists

Considering each of these four in turn, one can clearly see the challenges inherent in achieving them. Advancing journalistic professionalism requires not only the training of working journalists but also developing an educational system, currently lacking, to train future journalists properly.[267] The professionalism of both current and future journalists is also tested by the low wages and corruption that is endemic to the developing world. How are these factors to be rectified? The goal of achieving enabling legal and legislative infrastructure specific to journalists is another for-

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[266] Aspen, 5

[267] For an almost current analysis of journalism training in Africa see Wimmer and Wolf "Develoment Journalism Out of Date? An analysis of its significance in journalism education at African Universities," Munchener Beitrage zur Kommunikiationswissenschaft, 3 (May 2005). who find steady progress in the expansion in the number of journalism programs in Africa and a widening of curriculum. However, the pace of growth, while steady, is slow and many countries lack journalism programs entirely. Progress in establishing quality journalism programs elsewhere in the developing world is mixed. For example, in the Philippines – a country known for its 'diploma mills' - there may be abundant journalism/communications programs, but they are of poor quality. Few reputable institutions offer advanced programs, which limits the number of qualified graduates entering newsrooms throughout the country and those who do tend to gravitate to the metropolitan centres.

midable task. After all, legal and legislative rights that are applicable and meaningful to wide sectors of developing world populations are yet to be achieved. Similarly, the meaningful protection of journalists' rights requires judicial reform, including an honest, impartial judiciary and a security and police apparatus that is not corrupt. How can journalists' rights be secured when others' rights are not, where judicial reforms have not progressed, and police remain corrupt? The security of journalists in a developing state is dependent on all of the preceding factors, which are all dependent on reforming the formidable patron-client relationships endemic to many developing world states. Aside from revolution and a wholesale redistribution of wealth, how is this reform to be achieved?

4.3 Recommendations

Participants at the Aspen Institute conference on journalism and emerging democracies sponsored by the Aspen Institute arrived at a consensus on how Western governments can better promote the advancement of media in the developing world. Among their recommendations were: promote governmental reform, including the development of a strong, independent judiciary supportive of expressive rights. Develop professionalism among journalists, including the creation of journalistic associations and ombudsmen, as well as setting standards through training. Support the development of civil society. Promote the development of sustainable communications infrastructure. At an abstract level, participants also noted that slow economic development of a state can militate against independent media development due to corruption within the larger community and also corruption of the journalists them-

selves. Furthermore, the physical safety of journalists must be ensured before any of the other functions can be performed.[268] All of these factors should be taken into consideration when contemplating a media assistance intervention. Weak links within the chain of political development must be identified and targeted. Where leadership is lacking, will independent media be tolerated? Where the legal system is nascent, will the rights of the media be protected? Where social developments of literacy and education are poor, can the role of the media in transition be comprehended? These enabling conditions – leadership, law and human development - are but three conditions that must be bolstered, or at least exist at a rudimentary level, otherwise stand alone media assistance interventions seemed doomed to fail.

If CIDA is going to continue to fund media projects, this paper recommends that a programmatic approach, modeled upon the guidelines used by USAID, be implemented. In the 1999 report "The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach", USAID proposed five programmatic approaches or menu options for successful media interventions.[269] They are: 1. Shaping the Legal Enabling Environment, 2. Strengthening Constituencies for Reform, 3. Removing Barriers to Access, 4. Supporting the Capitalization of Media and 5. Training. Ideally, each of these five points is addressed coincidentally; otherwise the media intervention may encounter insurmountable obstacles. Each of the five points has, under each heading, several benchmarks to be achieved. For example, in shaping the legal enabling environment, the USAID document speaks of not only aiding in the formation of laws that protect

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[268] Aspen, 3

[269] USAID. The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach, available from http://www. usaid. gov/**democracy**/, 10.

the media but also a dedication to implementing those laws. As well, the training of media lawyers is a vital component of establishing a legal framework. Additionally, the provision of a legal defence fund for journalists is encouraged. Lastly, CIDA may be well advised to better select states for success. Often media assistance interventions occur in states that do not have the structure in place to foster independent media. Some of the indicators of increased freedom and effectiveness of the media culled from Kapoor include:

-relaxed censorship laws
-less government interference in the media
-heightened editorial independence of state media
-less harassment of journalists
-less state/private monopolization of media
-increased privately-owned media (without private monopolies or cartels)
-decreased legal proceedings taken against censorship
-increased % of professionally trained journalists
-existence of strengthened professional journalist associations[270]

To this list I add one more important indicator of the likelihood of a successful media assistance intervention: what is the economic condition of the state? Since a "nation's media are prisoners of the country's economic and political structures and its place in world history",[271] the assumption that independent and plural media will flourish regardless of economic (and historic) reality is naïve.

In summary, these are the recommendations of this study:

- Concentrate resources by targeting fewer countries for media assistance.
- Establish criteria for selecting states for media assistance by analyzing their likelihood of adopting the principles of plural independent media based on linkages; do not assist states that show few linkages between free media and

[270] Kapoor, 29.

[271] Bourgault, 96.

political development because, given the often small amounts committed by Canada to media assistance, the pooling of resources may accrue greater benefit in the most promising states. Pooling resources in fewer countries can also free up resources to sustain interventions. In selecting states, Canada should ask if there is confidence that leadership will commit to sustaining media? Are there indications that a rule of law will prevail?

- When targeting a country for media assistance, take a comprehensive multi-sector approach that not only trains journalists but also bolsters civil society and the political and legal institutions that support free media.

- Advance media professionalism. Closely select individuals for training, monitor their progress and support them and the NGOs working in this area morally, physically and financially, so as to deter corruption

- Develop indigenous journalism training by funding university programs at credible institutions, research chairs and scholarships to study both within the recipient country and Canada.[272] Through these initiatives young journalists must somehow become imbued with a strong aversion to bribe-taking and other forms of corruption, as well as develop a resistance to self-aggrandizing, score-settling tendencies.

- Improve salaries of journalists which, admittedly, will be a difficult task to accomplish. Wholesale economic improvements across the developing world seem likely the only solution to this challenge.

- Support indigenous self-regulating agencies

[272] There is already precedent for this: the Canadian Embassy in the Philippines awards the MacLuhan scholarship annually. However, this scholarship is often awarded to an experienced working journalist. It is the contention of this study that benefits would accrue from scholarships to study in Canada awarded to younger, less experienced journalism students.

4.4 What has happened since Windhoek?

On May 3rd, 1991 at the 26th session of UNESCO's General Conference at Windhoek, Namibia, delegates endorsed the Windhoek Declaration. The sweeping document sets out a bold agenda for media freedom in Africa. Windhoek asserts that "the establishment, maintenance and fostering of an independent, pluralistic and free press is essential to the development and maintenance of democracy in a nation, and for economic development". Point 10 is a call for the international community to "direct funding support towards the development and establishment of nongovernmental newspapers, magazines and periodicals that reflect the society as a whole and the different points of view within the communities they serve".[273] Nearing fourteen years since the declaration, the question arises as to what has happened since Windhoek. The most obvious and easily identifiable outcome of Windhoek has been more talking. Subsequent conferences were held in Almaty, Kazakhstan (1992) and Santiago, Chile (1994) with the goal of each conference to advance free media in Asia and Latin America, respectively. But while Western governments have apparently responded by contributing ODA to advance the media in the developing world, we must ask if the leaders of African states have fulfilled their responsibilities. Recent interference in the functioning of the media in Uganda and Zimbabwe, to name but two African states highlight the precarious status of journalism across the continent. Leaders of developing world states have an obligation to advance the media, otherwise, little will come of Western efforts.

[273] Many of the recommendations, above, such as establishing more journalistic training institutes, were included in Windhoek's recommendations. See Martin, 338.

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Vita Auctoris

Blake Roberts was born in 1962 in Woodstock, Ontario. He graduated from the University of Western Ontario with a B.A. in 1989. Shortly thereafter he commenced a journalism career which continues to this day. This Master of Arts thesis thus combines his professional experience with his academic interest in international relations, particularly the role of the news media in political transitions of the developing world.